On February 28, what should have been a routine diplomatic event in the Oval Office of the White House turned into a debacle. As media cameras broadcast the event live, U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance berated and belittled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The world witnessed how Trump and Vance coerced Zelenskyy to publicly thank Trump for the military support Ukraine has received, although Ukraine’s leader had already mentioned multiple times how he is grateful on behalf of the Ukrainian people for the support provided by the U.S. and other countries. Trump and Vance pressured the president of Ukraine to accept a minerals deal when Zelenskyy repeatedly asked Washington to provide security guarantees – which is the primary factor that is needed for Ukraine to end the war.
“You don’t have the cards right now,” he said during the verbal clashes with Zelenskyy. It was a visceral demonstration of how Trump handles diplomacy.
Former U.S. President Joe Biden had showed unwavering support to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, but now U.S. President Donald Trump has reportedly halted military support to Kyiv.
As Trump’s “America First” approach heavily emphasizes the economic interests of the United States, its conventional approach to diplomacy stemming from its role as the “world police” will likely be weakened during the second Trump administration. In other words, the United States seems to be ready to accept a multipolar world in which it is no longer a superpower dominating the international orders. With this move, the European nations will have to form a new defense coalition that can function without the U.S.
Assuming Trump’s undiplomatic approach becomes consolidated, possibly even outlasting the end of his term, the United States’ allies and like-minded countries will need to recalibrate their policies on regional conflicts and security issues. Based on the Ukraine example, the U.S. will not support its allies unless Trump sees a clear economic benefit to doing so.
Leaders on both sides of the DMZ separating the Korean Peninsula are watching these developments closely.
Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine, many experts have argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin would have not conducted the “special military operation” if Kyiv had not given up its nuclear weapons in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine ceded its nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees, but now faces the real prospect of losing nearly one-third of its territory to an invasion by its neighbor. For North Korea, the lesson is clear: nuclear weapons are the only real security guarantee. Pyongyang will likely not consider giving up its nuclear weapons preemptively.
Likewise, the abandonment of Ukraine will also add strong motivation for South Korea to think more seriously about developing its own nuclear weapons rather than relying on the strategic assets of the U.S.
Ahead of the “Freedom Shield” joint military drills between South Korea and the U.S. this month, the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Carl Vinson arrived in South Korea’s territorial waters in Busan. As every South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise is interpreted as an invasion rehearsal by the Kim regime, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korea’s top leader, denounced the drills through the North’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency.
“The action-accompanied hostile policy toward the DPRK pursued by the U.S. at present is offering sufficient justification for the DPRK to indefinitely bolster up its nuclear war deterrent,” Kim said. (DPRK is the acronym of North Korea’s official name: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.) “If the U.S. continues to renew its records in the anti-DPRK military demonstration, the DPRK will be naturally compelled to renew its records in the exercise of strategic deterrence.”
Since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, more and more South Koreans have supported their country acquiring indigenous nuclear weapons. Under the Biden administration, Washington sought to soothe South Koreans’ anxiety by assuring that its nuclear weapons will be used should North Korea attack South Korea under the name of “extended deterrence,” and expanding joint planning on nuclear scenarios on the Korean Peninsula.
But the Oval Office clash between Trump and Zelenskyy raises ample room to question whether Washington would really be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea, should there be any possibility of Pyongyang targeting California or other states in the U.S. with its intercontinental ballistic missiles. Despite the security treaty between the two countries, and Washington’s repeated guarantees, even South Koreans believe that the United States will not risk of putting its territory in trouble when the South is attacked by the North.
In this context, South Koreans have shown snowballing support for the idea of acquiring a domestic nuclear arsenal. Many believe it is the only effective means to deter the North’s preemptive strike against South Korea, considering multiple military provocations made by Pyongyang in recent decades and the failure of the peace process implemented by then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in in 2018 and 2019.
As Trump views security conflicts as opportunities for business negotiations, he will likely demand that Seoul pay more for the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea – like he did during his first term, when his administration asked Seoul to increase its contribution more than five-fold.
Right now, South Korea cannot meaningfully craft a policy response to the upheaval in U.S. foreign policy, given its own domestic difficulties. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has been suspended from his duties after being impeached by the National Assembly and will likely be removed from office permanently when the Constitutional Court issues its ruling in the coming weeks. Should the court confirm Yoon’s impeachment, South Korea will hold special elections in May to install a new president.
If the new South Korean president takes a similar approach to Trump’s – putting the country’s interest first under the name of pragmatism – he may consider developing nuclear weapons. Some comments from Trump and his advisers suggest his administration may allow South Korea to have nuclear weapons in exchange for pulling out the approximately 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
Under such a scenario, Japan may also take steps to possess nuclear weapons and revise the war-renouncing Article 9 of its Constitution – which was a situation that the U.S. had long wanted to avoid. But, under Trump’s perspective on security and diplomacy, the United States may allow other countries to “go nuclear” as long as there are economic benefits to be had.
With the U.S. giving up its role and mission to act as the “world police” and strengthen diplomacy and the rules-based international order, countries around the world, especially those in a tense security environment, will spend more money to developing weapons. The global arms race will be heightened and diplomacy centered on dialogue will no longer be the preferred means to resolve security conflicts.
What happened at the White House may have been meant to show Trump’s strong will to renew ties with Russia. However, to everyone outside of Moscow, Trump blaming the president of Ukraine for prolonging the war by resisting invasion by a nuclear-armed neighbor sends a clear signal: every country for itself, and woe to those not equipped to defend themselves – including with nuclear weapons.
