Indonesia’s armed forces still have a lot of work to do in making proper use of drones.
Two major challenges are pilot training and achieving interoperability between the services. Another is overcoming a predilection for big and costly drones instead of small ones like those wreaking havoc in Ukraine.
Training drone pilots is a time-intensive process, ranging from four to eight weeks for working with small drones and potentially years for large ones, which require skills akin to those of manned aircraft pilots. While operating small drones is comparatively simpler, it still necessitates proficiency in navigation, radio-signal management, manoeuvrability and target identification.
In Indonesia, the training for operators of large drones is largely bundled into arms procurement programs and typically involves air force personnel. But for small-drone operators, training is inconsistent and lacks standardised military instruction. Civilian training contractors are often engaged, but it’s doubtful that their programs align with operational, as the military has yet to develop a dedicated curriculum.
The next problem is ensuring effective coordination between drone units and members of other military branches, particularly electronic warfare teams. If one service jams signals from the drones of another, the equipment has little utility. Friendly fire must also be avoided.
The services need to coordinate also in planning and execution of missions and in damage assessment.
The Indonesian military, with its diverse force structure, has long had a problem in coordination. Introduction of drones is heightening the challenge. The introduction of an integrated tactical datalink system in 2024 is a step forward, but its effectiveness remains untested.
Indonesia’s pursuit of drone capabilities began nearly two decades ago. However, the momentum truly accelerated only in January, when the commander of the armed forces called for a doctrinal shift to align with emerging technological advancements, particularly emphasising the broader adoption of drones.
This was soon followed by a joint venture agreement between Turkey’s Baykar and Indonesia’s Republikorp for Indonesian production of 60 TB3 and nine Akinci drones. Meanwhile, the navy has raised the possibility of buying the Italian aircraft carrier Garibaldi, from which TB3s could operate.
Yet these developments prolong a pattern in Indonesia’s drone acquisition strategy: a persistent focus on procuring large drones. TB3s weigh not hundreds of grams or 1 kg, like a typical first-person-view drone, but 1.6 tonnes.
Evolving battlefield conditions demand that the forces look towards more comprehensive and layered drone deployment. Large and expensive drones must be complemented by a robust fleet of smaller, attritable drones.
In high-intensity conflicts and contested airspaces, large drones are vulnerable to dense air defence networks and electronic warfare countermeasures. Conversely, small drones have demonstrated sustained effectiveness under such conditions. Reports indicate that small drones account for 60 to 70 percent of Russian casualties in Ukraine, mainly due to their cost-effectiveness, ease of mass production and expendability.
Differences in drone employment persist across Indonesian military branches. The air force prioritises large drones for surveillance and strike missions, using 1.3-tonne CH-4s for patrols in the South China Sea and Aerostars of more than 200 kg in counterterrorism operations in Poso, a region of Sulawesi.
In contrast, the army and navy favour tactical and small drones for counterinsurgency and border security operations. Special forces and marines in Papua extensively use commercially available DJI, Autel and Ziyan drones, valuing their vertical take-off capabilities in constrained environments.
Integrating these varied platforms necessitates a doctrinal overhaul. A centralised data fusion centre for real-time intelligence sharing would allow drones to enhance precision strikes and battlefield awareness, aligning with the reconnaissance-strike complex model. Achieving this requires three elements: robust datalink infrastructure, seamless coordination and a steady pipeline of trained pilots.
Implementing a layered drone system offers three strategic advantages. First, it will streamline the military’s procurement process, preventing excessive platform diversification that exacerbates interoperability challenges and inflates lifecycle costs. Second, it optimises branch specialisation, reducing redundant efforts. Finally, treating drones as attritable assets necessitates a clear doctrinal framework that prioritises technological indigenisation. By concentrating defence investments on selected drone platforms, Indonesia can achieve economies of scale in production, ultimately driving down unit costs and fostering domestic defence industry growth.
As the Indonesian military expands its drone capabilities, success will hinge on more than just acquiring advanced platforms. Operational relevance and strategic effectiveness in modern warfare will be ensured through a well-balanced mix of large and small drones, backed by integrated training, robust data-sharing and doctrinal clarity.
