China’s recent military exercises in the South China Sea (SCS, 南海, nanhai) — including live-fire night drills, high-speed naval manoeuvres, and coordinated helicopter operations — reflect a broader, long-term strategic trajectory. Beijing is steadily consolidating its maritime presence, reinforcing territorial and resource claims, and shaping the regional balance of power. These activities are embedded in a dynamic cycle of strategic adaptation: China, the United States (U.S.), allied powers, and regional states continuously adjust deployments, partnerships, and policies in response to perceived maritime security threats.
Southeast Asian states respond in diverse and nuanced ways. Indonesia, and Malaysia largely pursue strategic hedging (战略对冲, zhanlüe duichong), balancing economic engagement with China while maintaining security ties with the U.S. and other partners. The Philippines and Vietnam actively balance through its alliance with Washington, whereas Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar tend toward bandwagoning (搭便车, dabianche) to maximise economic and diplomatic benefits from
Beijing. This spectrum of strategic postures underscores the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) agency: the bloc is not merely reactive, but actively shaping its own approaches to maintain autonomy amid intensifying great-power competition (大国竞争, daguo jingzheng).
The stakes in this maritime contest extend far beyond territorial claims. Control over sea lanes, rare-earth elements (REEs, 稀土元素, xitu yuansu), forward-operating bases, and maritime infrastructure has become central to the broader strategic rivalry. The SCS sits at the nexus of economic, technological, and military influence, linking local maritime disputes to a contest for power, resources, and regional norms. The expansion of China’s ‘ten-dash line’ (十段线, shiduan xian) in 2023 further underscores the symbolic and strategic importance Beijing places on maritime control, embedding national rejuvenation (民族复兴, minzu fuxing) into its maritime strategy.
China’s Strategic Interests and Ambitions
China’s maritime strategy in the SCS is driven by a mix of history, nationalism, and long-term strategic calculation. The old, yet misleading ‘nine dash line’ (九段线, jiuduan xian) — once the symbol of its maritime claims — has evolved in Beijing’s latest cartography: its 2023 official ‘Standard Map’ (标准地图, biaozhun ditu) now shows a ‘ten dash line’. For China’s leadership, this line represents more than just geography — it embodies the broader goal of national rejuvenation (民族复兴, minzu fuxing), a key part of the country’s political identity under Xi Jinping. This narrative reaches deep into China’s collective memory — particularly the ‘century of humiliation’ (百年屈辱, bainian quru), when foreign powers imposed unequal treaties, seized territory, and challenged Chinese sovereignty. Reclaiming control over disputed maritime spaces is seen within this framework as a moral and historical mission — restoring China’s dignity and reasserting its rightful role on the global stage.
For the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, ceding ground in the SCS would therefore carry symbolic and political costs far beyond territorial loss. It would be interpreted domestically as a failure to defend national sovereignty and a setback to the vision of restoring China as a strong, respected, and technologically advanced great power. Internationally, such a concession could weaken China’s influence over regional norms and maritime governance, undermining its broader strategic ambitions. In this sense, the SCS is not only a site of material competition over resources and strategic chokepoints, but also a symbolic arena where the narrative of national rejuvenation is actively constructed and defended.