Iran war puts Pakistan in a strategic squeeze

The widening Iran war is not just another Middle Eastern crisis. For Pakistan, it represents a strategic shock with immediate economic, security and political consequences.

Situated at the crossroads of the Middle East and South Asia, Pakistan cannot treat the conflict as distant geopolitics. Instability in Iran threatens to spill across Pakistan’s western frontier, disrupt fragile economic stability and complicate Islamabad’s delicate balancing act between Iran, Gulf Arab partners and the United States.

Pakistan shares a 900-kilometre border with Iran, much of it running through the volatile province of Balochistan. Long marked by insurgency, weak state control and cross-border militancy, the frontier already presents persistent security challenges for Islamabad. As the conflict has escalated, Pakistani authorities have closed several border crossings with Iran, keeping only limited routes open to allow Pakistani nationals to return home. The measures reflect a recognition in Islamabad that the war is a potential security contingency.

The war intersects with pre-existing tensions along the border. Relations between Tehran and Islamabad have historically oscillated between cooperation and friction, particularly over militant activity in the border belt. The Balochistan Liberation Army—an ethnonationalist militant organisation that supports the independence of Pakistan’s Balochistan province—has conducted sustained attacks against government installations, security forces and Chinese interests linked to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The current war introduces additional uncertainty. If instability in Iran weakens central authority or disrupts governance in peripheral regions, the Baloch question could acquire renewed significance. Iranian Baloch grievances have historically resonated across the border, and any autonomy claims in Iran—or even the perception of weakening state control—could embolden separatist narratives inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province.

Pakistan’s exposure is compounded by instability on its other western frontier. The country has described its escalating military confrontation with Afghanistan over cross-border militancy in terms that amount to an open war. Regardless of terminology, the operational reality is that Pakistan is simultaneously confronting cross-border militancy, heightened border tensions and domestic security pressures. A prolonged Israel–Iran conflict therefore risks placing Pakistan under a greater strain in both a conventional interstate sense and through simultaneous border volatility and militant opportunism.

The economic consequences could prove equally destabilising. The war has renewed global concerns about security in the Strait of Hormuz—the maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies pass. For Pakistan, a country heavily dependent on imported fuel and already grappling with inflation, currency depreciation and fiscal constraints, rising oil prices would impose immediate economic pressure. Higher fuel costs would ripple across electricity tariffs, transport and agricultural production, intensifying inflation and placing additional strain on households.

Internal politics also matters. Pakistan’s sectarian landscape has historically been sensitive to rivalries in the Middle East. Although the country has a Sunni Muslim majority, Shia Muslims constitute a significant minority, making sectarian dynamics an important element of Pakistan’s domestic politics. Pakistan also has a history of sectarian violence, with periodic clashes and targeted attacks between sectarian groups underscoring how external Middle Eastern rivalries can resonate within the country’s domestic political landscape.

The killing of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has illustrated how quickly regional crises can reverberate inside Pakistan. Protests erupted across several cities, including Karachi and Islamabad, leaving more than 20 people dead as demonstrations turned violent and crowds attempted to storm the US consulate in Karachi. These events underscore how a prolonged Iran war, particularly if framed in ideological or religious terms, could amplify sectarian mobilisation and political agitation within Pakistan.

Diplomatically, Islamabad faces a delicate balancing act. Pakistan maintains longstanding relations with Iran while simultaneously relying heavily on Gulf Arab partners for financial assistance and employment opportunities for millions of Pakistani workers. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remain among Pakistan’s most important economic partners, providing financial support during periods of economic crisis and hosting a large Pakistani expatriate workforce whose remittances underpin the country’s external accounts.

The challenge is further complicated by the existence of a strategic mutual defence agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, under which an attack on one country is treated as an attack on the other, committing both states to close security consultation and potential cooperation in the event of a threat to Saudi territorial integrity. While the pact strengthens bilateral defence ties, it also narrows Islamabad’s diplomatic flexibility during regional crises involving Iran.

For Pakistan, a prolonged war would magnify existing vulnerabilities. Economic disruption, border instability and diplomatic pressure from competing partners could intensify simultaneously. Protests in Pakistan following the killing of Iran’s supreme leader demonstrate how quickly Middle Eastern conflicts can translate into domestic instability.

Pakistan cannot control the trajectory of Middle Eastern escalation, but it must prepare for its consequences. In an increasingly polarised regional environment, resilience will depend less on rhetorical positioning and more on disciplined diplomacy, economic preparedness and internal stability.