After the US-Israeli attack on Iran began, the Chinese air force stopped flying around Taiwan—and the reason isn’t at all clear.
Observers have offered various possibilities, but none seems convincing.
The inactivity started the morning of 27 February and lasted until the morning of 6 March. At seven days, it is the longest halt since Taiwan began reporting on Chinese military flights in 2020. From 27 February until 9 March, only two aircraft were spotted. Notably, the Chinese navy has not paused its operations in the area.
Flight activity was already low this year. Last week, the year-to-date total was barely half of the level of the same time in 2025.
The Chinese air force uses the flights to gather information on Taiwanese response times, demonstrate its command of the area, and to drain Taiwanese resources as they have to scramble jets to monitor. So what are the possible explanations?
The period of inactivity partially overlaps with the the annual meeting of the Chinese National People’s Congress (parliament) and People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing. As ASPI’s Nathan Attrill has pointed out, activity often dips during ‘sensitive internal political moments.’ However, it is unlikely to stop completely. During the last year’s meetings, activity was exceptionally higher than usual. In 2024, it generally stayed between the seven and 14 daily intrusions.
Another possible explanation lies outside Taiwan and China. The intrusions stopped right before the US-Israeli attack on Iran. China receives 45 percent of its oil imports through the Strait of Hormuz, which is now closed. China has also told its top refiners to stop exporting oil, indicating some nervousness around future constraints despite its stockpiles.
However, China has oil stocks. More importantly, military aviation in other theatres does not seem to have been affected. Chinese air force planes were spotted near Japan’s southwestern islands and were also training in the South China Sea, making it unlikely that fuel conservation explains the lull around Taiwan.
Some Taiwanese officials have suggested the break is due to an upcoming summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, which is likely to take place between 31 March and 2 April. The US position on Taiwan’s status and arms sales to the island are likely to be on the agenda. Therefore, the officials suggested that ‘Beijing might be trying to create a false impression: I am peaceful, I am moving toward peace, so you should stop selling weapons to Taiwan.’
Again, this explanation seems unlikely. During previous high-stakes US–China summits, air sorties did not decrease. Neither does it fit with broader Chinese foreign policy, marked by a preference to negotiate from a position of strength.
Other analysts have also pointed out that the Chinese military intrusions aim to send a message to Taiwan, not the US. So is this absence of flights a message to Taiwan?
On 5 March, the Taiwanese parliament voted to send three separate special defence budgets to its Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee for review. This came after months of delay by the opposition parties, which together hold a majority in the legislature. Some analysts suggest the recent lull in Chinese military activity may be intended to signal that Beijing is not concerned by Taipei’s proposed increase in defence spending, thereby downplaying its significance.
Again, this reasoning seems unlikely. The debate on the special budget has been going on since it was announced in November, and the passage on 5 March was the result of cross-party talks on 24 February, before the break started. In addition, China had previously protested against the weapons sale and framed its end-of-year exercises as a response to them. Moreover, the break ended on the day of the vote, which would undermine any message it was trying to send.
Recent purges in China’s military have also been offered as an explanation by a fellow of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defence and Security Research. The latest high-level purges, those of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, took place in January. While these might affect large-scale operations around Taiwan, it is unclear why they would disrupt what have become routine operations around Taiwan—and not disrupt naval activity there nor air operations elsewhere.
Finally, some analysts fear this could be the prelude to a larger exercise around Taiwan, possibly even an attack on one of its outlying islands. By scaling back flights, they can do the necessary maintenance and come out in force. The US is distracted in Iran, so the timing would be perfect, they argue.
A large-scale exercise or attack would be preceded by other movements of naval assets, a gathering of material from other theatres and logistical preparations. None of these has been observed.
Given the opacity of China’s regime, it is impossible to know for certain the reason behind the pause. When China takes punitive action, it rarely clarifies the reason or even admits the action was punitive. However, this would be the first time China has taken positive action without clarifying.
While the break was ended by flights by two planes on 6 March, there have been no further intrusions since then. And the mystery remains.