The evolution of defence cooperation between India and Japan will hinge on how Tokyo responds to New Delhi’s growing expectations of it as a defence partner.
New Delhi is likely to expect Tokyo to encourage and support Japanese defence companies in collaborating with Indian counterparts. In addition, New Delhi would want the two countries’ defence cooperation to support the strengthening of India’s competitive strategic edge in the Indian Ocean region.
India’s rising international influence has made it an increasingly preferred defence partner for many states. Through these partnerships, New Delhi has made efforts to engage in co-development and co-production of equipment and technology, in line with its Make in India policy and its strategic goal of becoming a key defence exporter.
In a sign that Japan is prepared to follow a similar path, on 15 November 2024, the two countries signed a memorandum of implementation for co-development and co-production of an Indian version of a Japanese type of ship mast called Unicorn, which integrates various antenna systems. This is a milestone for Tokyo in opening a new phase of equipment and technology cooperation with India. However, New Delhi would expect that defence collaboration with Japan would expand to critical components such as tank and aerospace engines. New Delhi has reportedly expressed interest in joining the Global Combat Air Programme, of which Japan is a partner, and can be expected to seek collaboration in other major equipment, such as submarines.
In promoting the Make in India policy, the Modi administration has strengthened domestic production by engaging with its defence partners such as the United States, France and Israel on the co-development and co-production of equipment and technology, and its strategic goal is to become a major defence exporter. New Delhi has already exported the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile—developed in collaboration with Russia—to the Philippines. New Delhi would eventually want to export it to other states.
Another goal is to reduce its dependency on Russia as dominant defence supplier and achieve self-reliance through advancing domestic development and production. In this context, New Delhi intends to make Japan a driving force for boosting its domestic production, calling for greater efforts in collaboration.
India’s international profile has grown, and it is widely acknowledged as a security provider, especially in the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi’s enhanced profile and capability are seen in: its prompt response with regard to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in the Indian Ocean region; as well as its efforts leading initiatives such as the Milan biennial multilateral naval exercise, forums including the Indian Ocean region states, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region. This is a pivotal collaboration hub to enhance maritime security.
In HADR, the Indian Armed Forces have demonstrated their capabilities, with an enormous number of lives saved both at home and abroad. While New Delhi has repeatedly shown its commitment to regional security by employing its armed forces to countries in the region in HADR operations, such efforts are also a tool to expand its strategic influence over the Indian Ocean region.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has participated in these Indian initiatives and New Delhi would continue to welcome Japan’s ongoing involvement. The Indian military has already conducted a multi-service military exercise, Tiger Triumph, with the US military focusing on HADR and amphibious operations. New Delhi would likely explore the opportunity to do an inaugural round of multi-service exercises focusing on HADR with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). While New Delhi and Tokyo have agreed on bilateral and multilateral collaboration in preparing against and mitigating disaster risk through capacity building, New Delhi could explore opportunities for and make concerted efforts on HADR cooperation between the Indian military and JSDF in third countries in the Indian Ocean region. This could be based on the countries’ strategic calculations that Japan’s presence in the Indian Ocean region—where strategic competition with China has been intensifying—would help reduce the strategic space for China.
All of these strategic imperatives should make defence industrial cooperation a central part of the India–Japan defence agenda. In May 2025, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted the potential to collaborate on areas such as tank and aerospace engines, wherein the Indian defence industry and Japanese counterparts can step up their engagements, further demonstrating that New Delhi’s expectations of Tokyo are growing. Given the many global developments affecting Indo-Pacific security, these are opportunities that New Delhi and Tokyo need to act on or their defence cooperation could potentially lose momentum and stagnate. This stagnation would mean a lost opportunity to strengthen and diversify cooperation between the two forces so that it would enable them to deliver greater contributions to regional security, especially in the field of HADR.