The economic and social costs of the war in Iran, particularly its effect on global food security and agricultural production, are a reminder for Australia to strengthen food-security resilience at home and abroad.
The blocking of shipping at strategic maritime chokepoints constrains the supply of food and critical agricultural inputs. For example, in 2023–24, Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea forced companies to suspend or reroute traffic. This raised food prices and increased food insecurity worldwide.
Iran’s blockage of shipping around the Strait of Hormuz could similarly affect global food security and the stability that underlies it.
About a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz. Fuel shortages have increased the price of liquid fuels. Constraints on diesel availability, which is critical for the production and movement of agricultural goods, will likely lead to higher food prices and affect food production in the coming months.
The Middle East also remains a major source of the fertilisers Australian farmers rely on, particularly in the lead-up to winter crop planting when demand for nitrogen fertilisers peaks. As agricultural economist David Ubilava noted in The Conversation, ‘with effectively no domestic urea production, Australia is fully exposed to global supply shocks.’
Canberra has begun to recognise that vulnerability and has signalled a shift toward rebuilding sovereign fertiliser capacity. For example, it has backed domestic production through support for Strike Energy’s proposed urea facility in Western Australia, and Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility financing tied to Perdaman’s Project Ceres in Karratha.
Regional instability underscores why those steps matter. Australia can no longer treat domestic and regional manufacturing of critical inputs such as fertiliser and biofuels as optional economic projects; they form part of national resilience. When global supply chains fracture, a nation’s capacity to feed itself depends on whether it can produce the energy and fertiliser that keep crops growing, rather than relying on shipments from distant, increasingly contested markets.
The war’s impacts on Iran’s food production and export also hold lessons for Australia. Iran has agricultural regions that are well-suited to producing food that many of its neighbours cannot grow, particularly the Peninsula Arab states. This climatic advantage, combined with its location, makes Iran a major agricultural exporter to the Arab world. However, the trade relationship moving forward will be fraught given Iran’s attacks on those countries. As Arab nations turn to alternative, more distant markets to procure fruits, nuts and vegetables, the cost of these goods will likely increase.
The conflict also strains the regional cooperation needed to tackle agri-environmental challenges, including water shortages and risks to Persian Gulf fisheries. The bombing of oil infrastructure across the region has only added to the environmental challenges, risking farmland, waterways and public health.
In this, there are lessons for Australia too. Regional food trade, technical cooperation, transboundary issues and value-adding networks all matter to Australia and its Indo-Pacific partners. Leveraging the mix of climatic, workforce and technical diversity that comes with regional integration is a strength. But these can only operate if peace, trade and international relations are maintained and developed.
While the war precipitates food security challenges, agriculture has long played a critical role in Iran’s political history, shaping the various prevailing currents. For example, water shortages and land subsidence have weakened the country’s agricultural system and further exacerbated the economic conditions of Iranians, contributing to the discontent that has fuelled protests in 2011, 2012, 2018, 2021, 2025 and 2026.
Resources expended on war and ideological expansion come at the cost of alleviating social, agricultural and environmental pressures.
While Australia enjoys much greater political, economic and social freedoms than Iran, the relationship between stability and food production should be appreciated. Supply-chain pressures, biosecurity outbreaks, food contamination, environmental degradation, and other factors that drive price increases reveal the vulnerability of our systems. Coupled with a cost-of-living crisis, this vulnerability poses a risk as the public becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the ability of businesses and governments to maintain living standards, potentially fuelling social discontent and further straining social cohesion.
This is exactly why the proposed vulnerability mapping framework in the National Food Security Preparedness Green Paper is so critical. By systematically stress-testing our supply chains and critical inputs against geopolitical shocks, we can identify vulnerabilities before they manifest at the checkout. National security begins with the household budget and protecting it requires more than just aspiration; it demands immediate action.