The place for maintaining AFVs is where they’re based

Australia’s plan for sustaining its armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) far from their basing is the equivalent of Ukraine sending its tanks to Paris for repair and overhaul. This is illogical and unacceptable.

As part of Defence’s Land 400 program, the federal government should require that AFV sustainment contracts require repair and sustainment in Townsville, where most of the equipment will be based. This would build the capabilities required before they are needed during conflict and ensure that there is a reliable, well-resourced logistics chain on location to support forward combat.

The current sustainment concept for the AFV fleet appears to be to transport vehicles thousands of kilometres to their point of manufacture when they need heavy maintenance, rather than establish local capability in Townsville. If an operational planner were to brief this plan to a wartime commander, it would be dismissed as logistically impracticable, financially unacceptable and operationally unsuitable.

The plan also relies on assumptions that, if proven false, will entirely undo it. The assumptions appear to be untested, flagging huge operational risk.

The preferred course of action is impracticable. That is not to say it isn’t doable: there are no physical obstacles preventing the army from loading AFVs onto trucks and moving them the same distance as Berlin to Istanbul. But it doesn’t align with the army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, which says repair and sustainment of fighting equipment should occur as far forward as possible. A combat logistician charged with developing the AFV sustainment plan would move the repair assets as close as possible to the vehicles – not the other way around.

The preferred course of action is unacceptable on cost grounds. Defence has acknowledged pressure on its sustainment budget. The direct cost of transporting these vehicles will place further, unneeded pressure on this resource. The cost of moving one vehicle is likely to be in the order of A$100,000 – a sum that would go a long way to paying a maintainer in Townsville for a year. Rather than fund a local, well-paying job, the government will require Defence to repeatedly pay a strategic logistics partner.

There are also indirect costs, outside the sustainment budget. Transport infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, used to move these vehicles is maintained by state governments. Moving AFVs will place additional stress on it, imposing a cost over the life of type that states will carry. Unless specifically accepted by governments in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne, the decision is being forced on stakeholders without adequate consultation, which is unacceptable.

The preferred course of action is militarily unsuitable. The default heavy maintenance facilities for AFVs are in Ipswich, Geelong and Bandiana. Geelong is 2,550 km from Townsville. And Bandiana is 2,300 km away. Both are far too far for getting quick and dependable maintenance turnarounds. Moving equipment transcontinental distances for repair is not a suitable plan that would be briefed in combat, and nor is it suitable in peace.

If repair is to occur so far from the home base in peacetime, it seems that during conflict the contingency plan would be to mobilise local civil industry to provide the required support closer to Townsville. That assumes that local civil industry would, and could, do so. This is a critical assumption – if proven false, the plan fails when its success is most needed.

Legislation could theoretically compel local industry to support forward repair, as was done in World War II. An act does not, however, a capability make. Planning to use such measures to conveniently turn on a tap of qualified, trained, security-cleared facilities and workers amounts to hoping that logistics will just happen. The government needs to establish this specialised capability now, rather than trying to build it once the fighting starts. The professionals of the Australian Defence Force deserve no less.

Local capability must be built to offset critical risks. The current AFV production facilities and workforce are in Victoria and southern Queensland. The original equipment manufacturers have been given no reason to establish capability in Townsville; the government has provided no public tenders for maintenance and will require the ADF to pay from its own budget to freight equipment to workshops. This is perfectly convenient for these companies: they need to do nothing but let work be delivered to them for free. If required to establish facilities in Townsville, contractors could be assured of long-term work and revenue. The life of type for these vehicles is measured in decades, not quarters.

Establishing the facilities, growing the skills, and assuring the capability to repair AFVs close to the users will take time. The army has implemented the National Defence Strategy’s decisions for ADF force structure. The government now needs to underwrite those decisions. That means ensuring that ADF force structure is supported by a defence industry that can feasibly, acceptably and suitably provide the necessary repair and sustainment for its combat equipment.