Ensuring greater security self-reliance for Australia and being a more useful security partner lead to the same place. By being judicious about which military capabilities it invests in, Australia can ensure its own security, achieve greater freedom in its international engagement and remain a valued security partner to the United States and our region.
As we face global turmoil and a steadily deteriorating security environment, seeking greater security is understandable. When your essential security partner is widely seen as a source of instability, it’s also understandable to look at what more you could do to pursue self-reliance. But in doing so, it’s important that we recognise that self-sufficiency is unrealistic.
The idea of self-reliance in security is not new to Australian strategic thought. But despite its long history, it is a contested concept. It’s tangled in the struggle between proponents of a concept called ‘forward defence’ – a military structured for expeditionary conflicts alongside a powerful ally – and the alternative, ‘defence of Australia’ – a military structured to defend the continent. It has remained a perennial, not only as an enduring aspiration for those who believe Australia should chart a more independent course in the world, but also because of regular reminders of the limits of our great and powerful friends’ abilities to provide Australia’s security.
Australia remained anxious about the strength of its principal security guarantees in the second half of the 20th century as it watched events such as the 1942 fall of Singapore, US restraint during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation in the early 1960s, Richard Nixon’s 1969 speech in Guam, the US’s subsequent post-Vietnam approach to Asia, and Britain’s 1971 confirmation of its retrenchment from east of the Suez. Australia formally introduced self-reliance as a strategic principle in the 1976 Defence White paper and expanded upon it in the 1986 Dibb Report and subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper.
Facing growing anxiety over the nature of the US alliance, and following the 16 April release of the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP), it’s important to consider what self-reliance means. The 2026 NDS defines it as ‘an ability to employ and sustain credible military power to defend Australia in a crisis or conflict, including when support from allies or partners may be limited’. Self-reliance in the modern Australian strategic context means the ability to independently defend against a reasonable array of threats, including being able to militarily support regional allies and partners to deter adversaries and shape the environment.
This requires an ability to provide for oneself in terms of capability, including buying or making enough platforms, munitions and other consumables, and to ensure sufficient enablers (such as intelligence, communications, logistics and transport) in support of the above. Stated plainly, it seems straightforward, but a closer examination reveals complexities requiring trade-offs.
Self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency. Australia has never sought complete self-sufficiency in its military capability – such a policy would be unachievable even if it were attempted. Very few countries could aspire to have the resources to accomplish true autonomy and fewer still would consider the effort worth it. North Korea perhaps gives an indication of the true costs involved, and even then it’s arguable whether it has achieved the strategic autarchy it seeks. Israel spends around 8 percent of its GDP on defence and still would not claim self-sufficiency. But some modern nations have achieved high degrees of independence. The general rule is that as the degree of military autonomy increases, so does the expense.
Indeed, this holds true for Australia today. We couldn’t easily replace the US even if we wanted to, and in practical terms it remains an indispensable security partner. It has capabilities that Australia can’t or won’t replace. Alternative sources bring both risks and opportunities. For example, Australia often buys advanced capabilities from European manufacturers but frequently modifies them with US technology. There are also benefits that Australia gets only from the US. Examples include extended nuclear deterrence; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; communications and space technology; high-end platforms such as fifth–generation fighters and nuclear-propelled submarines; and access to certain types of advanced technology underpinning military capabilities such as precision strike.
Australia’s shift towards greater self-reliance was underway before the disquiet over the actions of the current US administration. The 2024 NDS and IIP laid a path towards greater self-reliance in key manufacturing sectors, sustainment of platforms and capabilities, logistics and key enablers such as cyber, space, communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. They also emphasised the importance of self-reliance in our immediate region as part of deterrence and denial strategies, as well as supporting long-range strike (including undersea warfare) in support of the latter.
To this end, the 2024 IIP included domestic missile and guided weapon assembly with a view to manufacturing; AUKUS nuclear submarine sustainment; northern base upgrades for long-range aircraft and maritime forces; greater investment into cyber and space systems; autonomous systems that can be produced and supported locally; and maritime and air denial capabilities for the northern approaches.
In developing greater strategic self-reliance for Australia, there should be no anxiety over offending the US. Successive administrations from at least Nixon onwards have been signalling that all their allies should do as much as they can to provide for their own security. We can’t predict the shape of future US administrations and their attitudes to security partnerships. The US may continue to oscillate between seeking closer partners and seeking greater distance from the world. Further, the future global architecture is unknown, but our region seems likely to continue to be a primary arena for competition.
While there is no precise formula for determining the degree of Australian strategic self-reliance, there is undoubtedly a sweet spot: providing for your own security as much as possible while also making yourself more useful as a security partner. The 2026 NDS and IIP recognise this, extending the momentum from their 2024 predecessors and laying out a plan to try to reach this goal. An enduring question remains: is Australia’s defence spending sufficient for effective self-reliance? In considering the answer, Australians should keep in mind that possession of a credible, self-reliant military capability gives us more room to manoeuvre in an uncertain world while making us more useful as a partner.