One posts his thoughts and threats on social media, takes calls from all his favourite reporters and directed his country’s attack on Iran from his holiday home in Florida.
The other has not spoken publicly since the war started, choosing to exert his control over Iran’s most powerful military force quietly.
Yet these two men – Donald Trump, the US president, and Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – will ultimately decide whether bombs will start falling on Iran on Wednesday night or if they can agree on an imperfect peace.
While JD Vance and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf are the public faces of negotiations, performing diplomatic theatre for cameras in Islamabad, the actual decisions happen elsewhere.
Mr Trump often appears to make decisions on impulse and in contradiction, announcing positions that his own negotiators must then scramble to explain or walk back.
Mr Vahidi asserts his authority through IRGC communiqués, the actions of forces under his command and decisions made by the supreme national security council.
Mr Vahidi assumed command during a firestorm on Feb 28, just hours after an American and Israeli air strike killed Mohammad Pakpour, his predecessor, and Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader.
The 67-year-old general has given no interviews, issued no personal statements, and appeared at no public events since that day.
His expertise is not in tactical brilliance but in suppression – managing proxy forces, crushing separatist movements and maintaining control over Iran’s fractious ethnic regions when central authority weakens.
Mr Vahidi is among the handful of IRGC commanders who now effectively govern alongside the leadership transition.
His résumé spans the Islamic Republic’s entire history – IRGC member since 1979, deputy chief for intelligence in 1981, first commander of the Quds Force (the IRGC’s external operations arm) in 1988.
During his tenure, he was instrumental in building up Iran’s proxy network, supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza and Iraqi and Syrian militias.
He served as defence minister from 2009 to 2013 under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then interior minister from 2021 to 2024 during a perilous period for the regime under Ebrahim Raisi.
When protests, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in custody, erupted in 2022 and threatened the regime, Mr Vahidi played a major role in the crackdown, restoring order through brutal suppression.
In the role, he oversaw the appointment of more military governors and police chiefs than any previous interior minister, positioning IRGC veterans throughout provincial power structures.
Despite his potential role as peacemaker, internationally, he has long been associated with violence.
Argentina and Interpol have issued arrest warrants for his involvement in the 1994 AMIA Jewish community centre bombing in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people.
The European Union sanctioned him in 2008. He cannot travel to most Western countries or neutral states that honour Interpol red notices.
Two speeches Mr Vahidi delivered in December last year offered a rare glimpse into his mindset.
Speaking at an Islamic governance conference on Dec 17, he told attendees: “Be assured that the commanders of the armed forces are in the field ahead of you and me, and they are ready. They have prepared themselves for major issues and will not back down at all.”
Ten days later, he said: “Friends hope that with reliance on this great nation and under the leadership of this wise leader, one day the oppressive America and the usurping Zionist regime will be brought down, and that day will not be far off.”
These statements established themes Mr Vahidi has maintained throughout his weeks of silence: military decisions supersede diplomatic ones, armed forces must prepare for extended conflict, and the Islamic Republic’s survival depends on projecting strength while absorbing punishment.
The confusion over the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz on Friday showed the power of Mr Vahidi and the generals.
Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s experienced diplomat who negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, announced the waterway opening. Within hours, IRGC naval forces fired on tankers attempting passage.
A US administration official told Axios the contradiction revealed Iran’s internal fracture.
The official said: “We thought they were negotiating with the right people, they had reached the cocktail of what they had agreed to, what could be announced. But what happened is the Iranian team went back, and the IRGC and those kinds of people said, ‘oh, no, no. You don’t speak for us’.”
But Ali Vaez, an Iran expert at the Crisis Group think tank, disputes that reading. “What you’ve seen in terms of mixed messaging is more a reflection of the inconsistent US position rather than infighting in Iran,” Mr Vaez said.
“When Araghchi came out and said Iran was opening the straits, it was right before Trump announced that he’s going to maintain the US’s blockade.”
The IRGC reversal, Mr Vaez argued, “wasn’t a rebuke of Araghchi. It was a response to Trump, a reaction to Trump”.
He added that “the assessments about the degree of infighting within the Iranian political system are exaggerated” and that “in terms of the system’s ability to build sufficient consensus around its negotiating position, I don’t see any serious cracks”.
Morteza Simiari, an Iranian security analyst, said Iran’s response was designed to disrupt “the decision-making system of Trump’s security team”.
Mr Vahidi’s job may also serve another purpose: protecting Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession.
He lacks the independent power base that would make him or his generals a rival to the late supreme leader’s son.
This dynamic explains his silence.
Mr Vahidi cannot afford the public profile that made Qassem Soleimani, his Quds Force successor, a household name.
Soleimani’s popularity made him politically powerful, but Mr Vahidi’s strength must remain operational, not charismatic.
Yet portraying Mr Vahidi as Iran’s sole decision-maker oversimplifies a more complex reality.
Mr Vaez cautioned against assuming that the IRGC commander controlled everything.
“The IRGC is not a monolithic institution. It has always had different views and different power centres,” he said. “The decisions are made within the supreme national security council. Vahidi certainly has an important voice there.”
Mr Vaez described Iran’s current leadership as unified by crisis rather than divided by faction.
“They are all sitting in the same boat” in “an existential battle for system survival”, he said, adding that “most of the key decision-makers have a Revolutionary Guards pedigree”.
The reality, Mr Vaez suggested, was that “it is still a collective decision-making apparatus” where Mr Ghalibaf and Mr Araghchi “would toe the line that is determined by the supreme national security council”.
Ali Larijani, who was previously the secretary of the council, was killed last month. His replacement, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, comes directly from the IRGC rather than political circles.
Mr Trump’s constant commentary creates its own confusion.
He told reporters that Iran agreed to surrender its uranium stockpile when negotiators actually discussed releasing $20bn in frozen Iranian funds in return for temporary limits on enrichment.
He claimed Mr Vance was already on his way to Pakistan when the vice-president remained in Washington, and threatened massive bombing while promising imminent peace.
In the middle of Mr Trump’s threats, Mr Ghalibaf’s diplomatic language and Mr Araghchi’s contradictory announcements, the silence of Mr Vahidi and his colleagues at the supreme national security council speaks loudest about who controls Iran.