It’s time for Brussels to rethink its policy of “critical engagement” with North Korea. Presented as less coercive compared to the U.S. approach, the EU emphasizes the importance of keeping limited humanitarian aid flowing to the country and promoting dialogue. Recent signals, such as moves by EU member states to reopen embassies in Pyongyang, are positive.
However, by aligning with Washington’s pressure approach through isolation tactics, EU policy often amounts to a softer echo of U.S. priorities – valuing sanctions over substantive engagement. This strategy has not only failed to deliver “unilateral denuclearization,” but also has the potential to further damage the non-proliferation security order they intend to protect.
Given North Korea’s designation of its neighbor in the South as a “hostile state,” its dismantling of the symbolic elements of inter-Korean relations, its deepening alliance with Russia – including the dispatch of troops to help its war effort in Ukraine – and a Trump administration returning to power, it becomes imperative to question this approach. Why does the EU continue to adhere to a softer iteration of the same failing policy, and what can be done about it?
Lessons From the Past
The reelection of Donald Trump as the next U.S. president has reignited debates about foreign policy priorities and the potential for renewed dialogue with North Korea. While not without valid criticism, Trump’s approach during his first term represented an unconventional attempt to break with previous U.S. administrations by pursuing high-level talks with North Korea.
However, the core issue remains for Washington: It continues to view North Korea through an antagonistic lens, as a “rogue regime” that can never be trusted. This preconceived idea has resulted in the fixation of pursuing an unrealistic goal of unilateral denuclearization, hindering engagement across successive Republican and Democratic administrations in all areas: diplomacy (no official representation through establishment of embassies), economy (U.N. Security Council sanctions remain uncompromising), and security (no formal peace treaty to end the Korean War or movement toward arms control negotiations).
It remains unclear whether North Korea will feature as a priority for the second Trump administration. Beyond a clear preference for “America First” type policies, there are other pressing issues in the Middle East, with China, and in Ukraine that could overshadow any renewed focus.
For that reason, any engagement with North Korea under a second Trump administration would require careful consideration. Trump’s preference for a “maximum pressure”’ approach, as seen in the lead-up to his 2018-19 summitry with Kim Jong Un, could also escalate tensions before any negotiations take place. While it’s conceivable that Trump might attempt to use his stated goal of quickly ending the war in Ukraine to influence North Korea – potentially pushing for a withdrawal of its troops from Russia – it is unclear what remaining leverage the United States holds to achieve that objective. Current U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent reliance on China to pressure Pyongyang, as shown in his meeting with Xi Jinping, highlights the limitations of the U.S. policy vis-à-vis North Korea.
