Satellite images show potential military structures on Vietnamese features in Spratly Islands, which experts say could curb China’s advantage.
For years China has had an advantage in the South China Sea as its land reclamation programme on reefs of strategic significance created a possible base for large planes and vessels, including navy ships.
But the dominance might be challenged in the future as Vietnam, another claimant of the Spratly Islands, known as the Nansha Islands in China, pushes ahead with its own land creation and airstrip construction on reefs in the area.
Recent satellite images reveal the emergence of potential military structures on several Vietnamese features in the Spratly Islands and the formation of new embankments enclosing six protected areas. They have been seen across Barque Canada Reef, Central Reef, Tennent Reef, Namyit Island, South Reef and Ladd Reef.Another runway could be built on the Vietnamese occupied Pearson Reef, according to a report published in October by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
Vietnam initiated its latest expansion of facilities in late 2021. Several think tanks have highlighted their rapid pace and large scale.
An AMTI report released in June indicated that Hanoi was poised to achieve record-breaking island construction efforts this year. It said that from November to May, Vietnam expanded its territory by around 280 hectares (692 acres) across 10 different features in the Spratlys, signalling a marked escalation in its territorial claims.
Analysts say a 3km (1.9-mile) runway taking shape on the Vietnam-controlled Barque Canada Reef considerably enhances Hanoi’s capacity to deploy combat aircraft in the Spratly Islands and boost its maritime capabilities, an advancement that could potentially offset Beijing’s strategic dominance in the South China Sea, much of which China claims as its own.
Vietnam already has a 1.3km runway on Spratly Island and the completion of a 3km runway would allow it to operate a wide range of military aircraft – from fighters to transport planes, reconnaissance and early warning aircraft, and barring only the largest bombers – according to Chen Xiangmiao, an associate research fellow at the Hainan-based National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
“Such a development would substantially boost Vietnam’s abilities in air superiority, surveillance and deterrence throughout the whole Spratly Islands,” he said last month on the sidelines of the Symposium on Global Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance in Sanya, Hainan province.
Chen noted that the new Vietnamese airstrip, once operational, would significantly enhance Vietnam’s ability to project power, extending its reach to the Philippine archipelago.
“This could challenge the strategic position China has achieved with its three major airstrips, deterrence abilities and airspace control in the Spratly Islands which were developed through its earlier island constructions,” he said, adding that the Vietnamese airstrip deserved close scrutiny, not just from China but from all claimant states in the South China Sea.
Before the facilities were developed, Vietnamese aircraft operations were limited to shorter distances. However, the new base and runway allowed for extended flight range, significantly boosting Vietnam’s military capabilities, Chen said.
In 2013, China launched a substantial island-building initiative in the Spratlys, a mix of civilian and military infrastructure that includes military-grade airstrips, radar stations, harbours and troop accommodation. Beijing maintains that its constructions are on features it controls and its actions are “lawful and justified”.
China has its “Big Three” Spratly Islands – Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross – which have been fully militarised with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment, fighter jets and runways longer than 3km.
Bill Hayton, an associate fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, said Hanoi was trying to “catch up belatedly” with China’s activities over the past decade.
He said Beijing had secured a “dominant position” in the South China Sea disputes with its island construction drive, with the upgrades allowing Chinese ships – naval, coastguard and maritime militia – to be posted there almost permanently with safe harbour and resupply facilities.
However, Vietnam’s outpost and second runway construction could give it “greater physical control” in the Spratly Islands, he said.
“[The airstrip] allows Vietnamese aircraft to do longer-range patrols in the South China Sea, rather than going back to Vietnam all the time, and they would have a potential refuelling place. If a plane has a malfunction, then it doesn’t have to return home.”
In the case of military conflict or if one runway is out of action, the new airstrip could afford Vietnam options, according to Hayton.
Hu Bo, the director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), said the runway on Barque Canada Reef could put significant pressure on China, in part because Vietnam occupied strategic locations and a large number of islands and reefs.
He said that of the claimant states, Vietnam occupied the most features in the Spratly Islands, with some near the Philippines and Malaysia.
“If these features are well developed, they could offset the strategic advantages China gained from its own island constructions between 2013 and 2015, and increase the complexity of the China-Vietnam maritime dispute,” Hu said.
The Spratly Islands, comprising more than 100 large and small islands, reefs and atolls, are not under the control of any single nation but are variously within the 200 nautical mile (370km) exclusive economic zones of Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as within the scope of China’s nine-dash line that claims much of the waterway.
Hayton says Beijing is not likely to be alarmed by Hanoi’s progress. “Even if these runways are completed, they do not seem to have all the same infrastructure that the Chinese installations got – hangars from missiles, close-in weapons systems, radar, surveillance technology.”
So far, there is no indication that Vietnamese outposts are equipped with this level of infrastructure and its outpost construction could “even up some of the strategic imbalance that has emerged since China started building its island bases” in 2013, according to Hayton.
Still, a Chinese naval affairs analyst said he was concerned about the potential peril of Vietnam allowing the US and Japan to use the new airstrip and a possible new airport.
Wu Shicun, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies and chairman of the Huayang Centre for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, said that as Vietnam heralds its island construction, it could make a long-term dent in China’s strategic advantage.
“Given the existing level of security cooperation between the US and Vietnam, and between Vietnam and Japan, this airport, once operational and potentially accessible to American and Japanese forces, could significantly offset geostrategic advantages and long-range capabilities Beijing gained in the South China Sea between 2013 and 2015,” he said.
Hayton said it was “implausible” that Vietnam would open the airstrip to foreign militaries to use because foreign vessels – with the exception of ships from Russia – would find access to its ports difficult.
“Vietnam’s closest military partner is Russia. … Vietnam puts all kinds of restrictions on foreign visitors, even to mainland Vietnamese harbours, the Americans get one ship visit a year. It is the same with other countries. The Russians have much easier access,” he said.
Hu also did not expect the airstrip on the reef would open access to the US or Japan because it sought a position poised between China and the US.
Hanoi navigates the complex geopolitical landscape via its “bamboo diplomacy” approach of balancing its relations with the world’s major powers and ensuring its national interests are safeguarded while maintaining strategic autonomy. Within nine months from September last year, Vietnam hosted the presidents of the US, China and Russia.
In contrast to Beijing’s typically assertive responses to the Philippines, China has so far maintained a relatively restrained reaction to Vietnam’s land reclamation endeavours in the region.
“But I believe we have reached a point where a more assertive reaction is necessary. If left unchecked … Vietnam’s ongoing construction will only expand, further disrupting the existing balance in the region. This will only lead to greater instability and increased uncertainty,” Chen said.
Noting that Malaysia had expressed disapproval through a formal protest, Chen said he expected an uptick in such responses.
Meanwhile, Hayton said Vietnam’s efforts were not a major threat to Beijing because there was a significant disparity between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime capabilities.
“What Vietnam needs to be able to do is to have some kind of deterrence that could impose some costs on China if there was ever a military action. I do not think it would have threatened China in the real sense, but it could complicate China’s military planning,” he said.
