“Arevisionist state has arrived on the scene to contest the liberal international order, and it is not Russia or China, it is the United States. It is Trump in the Oval Office, the beating heart of the free world. The incoming administration contests every element of the liberal international order – trade, alliances, migration, multilateralism, democratic solidarity and human rights.
“The narrative now at home and abroad is that the US is not what we thought it was. Trump was not an aberration, not a bug, but a feature of American politics and of America’s story.”
This stark assessment of the impact of Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January, by the Princeton University professor of politics John Ikenberry, leads him to a question: “Will the new global order be determined less by the US and more by its legacy partners? Will they seek an alternative framework globally and regionally, or will they make bets to ride this out, and do the transactional politics that Trump is going to request?”Already, from Ankara to Brussels to Tehran and Moscow, the whole world seems catalysed and in motion as countries seek answers to versions of that question. Without Trump taking a single executive decision, they are positioning, responding and adjusting to the long shadow he represents. Even Trump himself seems a little unnerved at what his return is unleashing. “The world seems to be going a little crazy now,” he recently admitted in Paris.
Amid the craziness, three distinct forms of response to Trump are starting to emerge.
An “ideologically aligned” group is emboldened, including populists in Europe, Latin America and Israel who believe their often Russia-friendly brand of nationalism will benefit from being in the slipstream of America First. The breakup of the European Union, an Argentina-style chainsaw taken to regulation, a new security architecture with Russia, regime change in Tehran: all become possibilities.
A second group, led by China, foresees a diplomatic shake-up in which America becomes an agent of instability, leading to some kind of globalised realignment. For Beijing – facing the threat of 50% tariffs – the silver lining is that Trump’s willingness to treat friends as foes may create a leadership vacuum that China, as the so-called advocate of “the global majority”, can exploit.
It is one version of the “alternative framework” of which Ikenberry speaks. Trump seems aware of that risk and is already threatening to impose 100% tariffs on the Brics countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates – if they try to replace the US dollar with another currency.
The third, more phlegmatic, group is made up of America’s “legacy partners” in Europe and the G7 group of liberal democracies. They still hope that with the right mix of argument, flattery and self-abnegation they can make a rational case that appeals to Trump’s self-interest.
Leaders of these nominal allies, however much they revile Trump’s methods, look at American power and feel they have no choice but to interact with him. “We have to dance with whoever is on the dancefloor,” Mark Rutte, the new Nato chief, said in February. The battle then becomes one for Trump’s brain, and to persuade him that America’s interests do not stop at its borders. But if this strategy does not work, insurance is being taken out by strengthening alternative frameworks. Polling published this month by the European Council on Foreign Relations, for instance, showed that right across Europe voters prefer more Europe to more Trump.
That need not be surprising. Trump, it should be recalled, describes the EU as a “not-so-mini-China”. His threat to impose tariffs has already stimulated an internal debate in Europe on how to respond. The president of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, has been accused of running up the white flag by saying Europe should try to ward off tariffs by buying US arms and liquefied natural gas.
The former WTO director general Pascal Lamy described her strategy to “calm this barking dog” as “absolutely wrong”. He said: “You never negotiate with the US, whatever the president, from a position of weakness. We must be strong by showing the importance of our market to US exporters.”
But even he admits this will be testing since different countries have different levels of dependence on the US. “Our strength is the size of our market and our unity. Our weakness is our lack of geostrategic consistency and our disunity.”
Ukraine
Trump’s true existential threat to Europe lies in Ukraine. Without having revealed a detailed peace plan, Trump seems to want to threaten both sides – Vladimir Putin with rearmament in Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy with withdrawal of support – to force an end to the war.
Asked recently if he was concerned about Trump’s intentions, the outgoing head of the EU’s foreign service, Josep Borrell, said: “How could I not be worried? Certainly I am. This is the big elephant in the room; this is the question. What will Europeans do if the new American administration is no longer supporting Ukraine? This is the question the Ukrainians were asking me when I was visiting Kyiv. It came from the last soldier to the president of Ukraine. I don’t think anyone knows the answer.”
Trump complained: “We are in for $350bn. Europe is in for $150bn. That needs to be equalised. The war with Russia is important for everyone, but it’s more important for Europe than us. We have a little thing called an ocean between us.”
Faced by the risk Trump will agree a deal with Putin over his head, Zelenskyy at the end of November took pre-emptive action. He proposed a ceasefire in which Ukraine would solely rely on diplomacy – not armed conflict – to regain the territory lost to Russia in the east since 2014, but in return the remaining part of Ukraine would be offered Nato membership, and not just the “well-lit bridge” to membership at some point in the future.
But Rutte has already rejected his plan, arguing that none of the key players, including Russia or the US, would accept Ukrainian membership of Nato now. Nato membership includes the key commitment that an attack on one member is an attack on all.
That leaves Europe facing some fateful decisions and not much time in which to take them.
