The core of a coalition to oppose China in the South China Sea must be the Southeast Asian claimants themselves. They must recognise that the threat they jointly face requires them to settle or at least to shelve internecine maritime disputes. Vietnam and the Philippines have made some progress in this regard, as has Indonesia, despite its official position that it has no direct boundary dispute with China.
Vietnam has shown public solidarity with the Philippines. Malaysia is the outlier among ASEAN claimants, preferring to deal with Beijing bilaterally and sometimes adopting diplomatic positions that have matched China’s demands to exclude the United States and others from involvement in the South China Sea.
Among the non-claimant ASEAN states, Singapore needs to rediscover its voice as an impartial advocate of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. And whenever China’s grey zone behaviour towards the Philippines, or others, clearly contravenes the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct, Singapore and other ASEAN members should not shy from saying so publicly and in the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations between ASEAN and China.
Taiwan also has an important role to play, as both claimant and occupier of the largest natural feature within the Spratlys group, Itu Aba. It has a direct interest in not allowing China’s grey zone activities near Second Thomas and Sabina shoals to normalise blockade tactics that could be applied against Taiwan itself or its outlying islands.
Taiwan also has deep experience of China’s maritime activities in its immediate vicinity. Sharing what it has learned with Southeast Asian frontline states would be help them to develop grey zone counter-measures.
Taiwan has shown some interest in emulating the example set by the Philippines Coast Guard in publicly exposing China’s grey zone activities. Transparency campaigns can generate international support and stake out the moral high ground against China. But they don’t deter Beijing or moderate its behaviour much.
Transparency is not a stand-alone tactic against an adversary like China, which is impervious to reputational damage. It must be integrated into a national maritime strategy, with support from the armed forces and centrally coordinated government communications.
Partners should certainly call out China by name when condemning its grey zone behaviour in the South China Sea. There are too few statements of solidarity with the Philippines, and they’re too often delegated down to the ambassadors in Manila. Foreign ministers’ statements would carry more authority.
Non-littoral countries, especially major maritime states, should clearly say their national interests are at stake in the South China Sea. Recent Japanese statements in support of the Philippines have been helpful, as have those of the EU. South Korea needs to be much more vocal, given its exposure to South China Sea shipping routes.
Then, if governments declare national interests in the South China Sea, they should next provide material support. They should help lift Southeast Asian states’ capacity for maritime domain awareness or donate ships and aircraft to assert presence and deny China space to occupy the grey zone.
Governments need to be beware of bad-faith offers of dialogue on maritime issues from Beijing, mere efforts to neuter public criticism by seeming to offer closed-door forums to air concerns and privately influence China’s thinking. It can make continuation of such sham dialogues contingent on health of bilateral relations.
Finally, acceptance of the grey zone paradigm should not prevent escalatory reactions when these are appropriate. When China’s provocations in the South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait or elsewhere cross the line from grey zone to black and white; for example, military intrusions into uncontested territorial airspace and waters, then governments need to be step up their reactions accordingly.
