Despite the good feelings following the first Ishiba-Trump summit, there are major challenges ahead.
Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s first meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump went as well as anyone in Tokyo or Washington could have hoped. But for all the good feelings on both sides, there are major challenges ahead. On the security front, neither Americans nor Japanese are fully committed to their alliance commitments. On economics, there’s more public buy-in but far less commitment from the United States. And outside the bilateral relationship, the second Trump administration’s policies are likely to affect the alliance in a host of negative ways.
The Ishiba-Trump joint statement largely restated past commitments, including the United States’ commitment to defend every inch of Japanese territory with the full U.S. arsenal, and included a laundry list of other joint Indo-Pacific priorities (including Taiwan). In their joint press conference, the two talked each other up, with Trump saying Ishiba had “qualities of greatness” and Ishiba calling Trump “powerful” and “sincere.” Certainly Ishiba outperformed public expectations in Japan (where two-thirds doubted he’d be able to build a good relationship with Trump) and is now reaping the benefits at home.
Ishiba’s successful visit builds on a binational relationship that both Americans and Japanese value. As a binational Yomiuri-Gallup survey found in December, both Americans and Japanese support a stronger Japanese defense capability, and both publics have similar views of the most likely threats in East Asia (China, Russia, and North Korea). And Americans link those two quite clearly: on a bipartisan basis, the American public wants to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance in order to help offset a rising China. This fits with Americans’ broader preference to take steps to contain the rise of China’s power, a trend which a majority of Americans see as a critical threat to the United States.
However, there are limits to what Americans support doing, even for such a favored ally. Should Beijing seize the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – Japanese territory covered by the U.S. defense commitment to Japan – a majority of Americans oppose using U.S. forces to retake the islands. And while 7 in 10 Japanese expect the United States to come to the aid of Taiwan should China invade, neither the American public nor American policy experts are particularly enthusiastic about the idea.
As polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has found, Americans’ top priority in China-U.S. relations is avoiding a military conflict with China, and that emphasis carries over into how the public approaches crises involving U.S. allies and partners. While understandable – few publics are eager to send their militaries off to war against peer competitors – this reticence to back the United States’ closest ally in Asia reveals a major gap between alliance commitments and public expectations.
