The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) foreign ministry announced in July 2025 that Beijing would sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone treaty. Commonly known as the Treaty of Bangkok, it was signed in 1995 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states and bans nuclear weapons in the region.
The treaty extends into nations’ exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves, covering virtually the entire region, including key shipping lanes. It prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, control, testing or use of nuclear weapons within the zone.
The CCP’s decision to sign the protocol — coupled with a similar announcement by Russia —could impact United States military operations and regional security. The statements by the authoritarian regimes in Beijing and Moscow “do not signal peace for this turbulent region. On the contrary, this willingness is more like a signal of war,” according to Gordon Chang, a senior fellow at the Gatestone Institute, a U.S.-based think tank. “In fact, this treaty is one-way. Beijing expects others to abide by their commitments, yet it arbitrarily violates its obligations.
“Therefore, while Beijing and Moscow may sign the protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok, the United States should not do so,” as it would undermine regional nuclear deterrence, Chang wrote in July 2025 for The Hill website.
None of the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. — has acceded to the treaty via the protocol, which prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any state party within the zone.
Despite proposed revisions in 2011 to address maritime transit and port visits, the issue of expansive overlapping claims related to continental shelves and EEZs remains a significant obstacle to NWS accession.
The CCP’s recent announcement is among its decades-long series of statements signaling interest in signing the protocol. Notably, as recently as 2021, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed China’s desire to strengthen its influence through such agreements.
On July 15, 2025, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. described the CCP’s signing announcement as “just for show,” stating that China should first denuclearize to demonstrate sincerity.
In response, CCP National Defense Ministry Senior Col. Jiang Bin cited China’s “no first use” policy regarding nuclear weapons. He warned that the Philippines could ultimately be positioned as a “forward outpost” in a great power nuclear contest.
The CCP’s long-standing strategy seeks to position Beijing as the preferred partner in Southeast Asia, while limiting the freedom of navigation of the U.S. and its Allies and Partners. This is another example of the CCP employing strategic lawfare — the use or misuse of law — to achieve a policy objective, including justifying coercion and achieving effects similar to those gained by conventional military action.
If the CCP signs the protocol, it could create complications and limit U.S. deterrence options for the region. One concern focuses on the distinction between the transit and deployment of nuclear weapons, especially as it relates to submarines. The treaty does not explicitly prohibit the transit of nuclear-armed vessels. The CCP could seek to exploit this ambiguity to complicate maritime planning and operations by the U.S. and its Allies and Partners.
Additionally, the CCP could attempt to use the treaty to bolster its campaign against Western nations basing nuclear-capable forces — including surface, subsurface and air — in the Indo-Pacific. The CCP has already targeted the Philippines, specifically citing the U.S.-made Typhon, a conventional missile system, as potentially prohibited under the treaty — part of Beijing’s narrative that the nuclear risk in Southeast Asia stems primarily from the U.S., not China.
The CCP claims that despite possessing nuclear weapons, it has never used them to threaten any country and has never threatened to use them. However, China’s public nuclear assurances continue to raise questions about the sincerity of Beijing’s commitments.
For example, China and Russia conducted their ninth combined strategic bomber patrol in late November 2024 in the Indo-Pacific. It was China’s first use of the nuclear-capable H-6N bomber in a signaling event and represented the latest inconsistency in its nuclear commitments. Longtime U.S. allies Japan and South Korea were almost certainly the target of the combined nuclear bomber patrol, analysts said.
China has engaged in other activities that are inconsistent with its professed no first use policy. U.S. intelligence assessments from the Cold War indicate that Beijing’s nuclear weapons probably targeted population centers of nonnuclear U.S. allies.
Moreover, China continues to increase its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country, adding about 100 warheads a year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported in June 2025. Many analysts interpret its rapid buildup as a threat.
Whether or not the CCP accedes to the Bangkok treaty, its maneuvers demonstrate its willingness to use lawfare to gain political leverage.
