In a recent speech at the 2025 Shangri-la Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, told the audience that China’s attempt to conquer Taiwan by force “could be imminent.” The possibility of such a rapid escalation stems from China’s increased military activity around Taiwan, which has made distinguishing exercises from true military action nearly impossible. According to Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has reached a “rapid boil.” How rapid? In his April testimony before the Congressional Armed Services Committees, Paparo said there has been a 300 percent annual increase in Chinese military pressure against Taiwan. He later noted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is “stretching their legs” to meet President Xi Jinping’s 2027 military readiness goal of being capable of taking Taiwan by force.
As China’s increasing operational tempo has reduced the United States’ ability to distinguish military action from an exercise, US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has revealed reduced capacity and greater cracks in the United States’ sustainment strategy. This combination of reduced warning and response poses serious risks to the United States’ ability to deter a forceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait, a key objective of the Trump administration.
‘Dress rehearsals for forced unification’
While China’s 300 percent increase in pressure is alarming, this development unfortunately reflects a broader, consistent trend of escalating PLA activities, including persistent crossings of the Taiwan Strait’s median line. According to data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, PLA sorties across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese-declared dividing line between Taiwan and China, have increased from 953 incidents in 2021 to 3,070 in 2024.
Taiwan, with a leaner force, must either dedicate an increasing number of resources toward incursion responses or cede the declared dividing line to the PLA, allowing PLA forces to move even closer to Taiwanese territory unchallenged, reducing warning time. The PLA’s efforts are also a deliberate attempt by Beijing to cognitively shift Taiwan’s perception of actions in the strait, creating “the new normal” of military activity in its immediate vicinity, which could reduce reaction time in a real invasion.
Paparo underscored the seriousness of this escalation in his recent testimony, stating: “These are not just exercises—they are dress rehearsals for forced unification.” Earlier this year, he went even further on the record, warning that the increased operational tempo has brought INDOPACOM “very close to that [point] where on a daily basis the fig leaf of an exercise could very well hide operational warning.”
Placing forward forces
The erosion of operational warning time means INDOPACOM and US decision makers could have less time—and less certainty—to respond if China initiates military action against Taiwan. As the PLA continues to degrade US and Taiwanese abilities to detect tactical and operational indicators of conflict, China’s geographic advantage across the Pacific becomes even more acute.
According to the US Seventh Fleet, forward-deployed forces cuts an average of seventeen days in transit time, compared with continentally-based forces. While exact times are dependent on individual capabilities and other conditions, most conventional options for sea-based transport are slower and vulnerable to China’s expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope. Airlift options to support Taiwan with asymmetric capabilities, such as Patriot batteries or Harpoon missiles to destroy high-value targets, are similarly constrained by the sheer scale of the Pacific and limited US airlift capacity.
Paparo’s April testimony highlighted these logistical realities. He revealed that it took seventy-three flights to rapidly move a single Patriot battalion from United States Forces Korea’s area of operations to US Central Command. Furthermore, TRANSCOM has revealed to the Congressional Armed Services Committees that the C-5M “Supergalaxy,” a critical aircraft for airlift operations, had a reduced mission-capable rate of 46 percent in 2024, a 6 percent decrease from 2023. Even assuming efficiency improvements, there remain significant geographic constraints on how quickly the United States can surge critical defensive systems across theaters with its current airlift capabilities.
Moreover, Paparo’s admission—coupled with his direct warning that “lift requirements must be paid attention to”—amounts to a direct appeal for Congress to shore up TRANSCOM’s resources. The current situation not only strains INDOPACOM’s ability to support Taiwan if US policymakers choose to intervene, but it also risks undermining the defense of US forces and territories in the region. Moving critical assets westward—from the continental United States to Hawaii, from Hawaii to Guam, and onward to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—will face time and lift constraints, as well as the active interference of PLA forces once conflict begins. The enemy gets a vote—and it is unlikely that the PLA would allow US or allied air and sea lift into the theater unopposed once hostilities are underway. This makes the window between when China has decided to initiate conflict and when conflict actually begins critical.
As operational warning time continues to erode—and with TRANSCOM investments years away from fully materializing—INDOPACOM must increasingly rely on forces already positioned west of the International Date Line (IDL) for both deterrence and, if necessary, combat operations against Chinese military aggression. TRANSCOM’s revelation that 85 percent of the United States’ combat power remains in the lower forty-eight states indicates that much more work needs to be done in placing forces forward.
Three next steps for the Trump administration
Given these growing challenges, US policymakers must urgently consider three steps to strengthen forward presence and responsiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
1. Increase US military presence in partner nations through SOFAs
Hegseth recently declared that improving the United States’ forward defense posture is the first action that the Trump administration will take in strengthening deterrence. In order to ensure this action, the Department of Defense and the Department of State should leverage the frameworks of existing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) to expand the US military presence west of the IDL. While SOFAs primarily govern the legal status of US forces abroad, supplementary agreements, implementing arrangements, and diplomatic notes provide the flexibility to adjust troop levels and operational footprints.
Some groundwork for such expansions has already been laid. Under the Trump administration, the Department of Defense announced plans to add additional personnel to US Forces Japan (USFJ) to transition it from an administrative headquarters to a war-fighting command, although these initial moves appear focused only on the USFJ headquarters staff itself. Nevertheless, they suggest an emerging willingness by Tokyo to consider hosting additional operational forces.
Other allies, such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines, offer additional opportunities for expanded presence through rotational deployments, pre-positioning of equipment, and basing initiatives. Opportunities to flex the most capable and necessary US assets, like the recent inaugural deployment of NMESIS, the Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Luzon Strait during an exercise with the Philippines, is one such example. Deploying US F-35 aircraft to the Korea Peninsula, potentially permanently, is another. Building on these relationships will be crucial to ensuring sufficient warfighting capability in theater for deterrence and crisis response.
2. Increase the tempo of US campaigning in the Indo-Pacific
Campaigning, or the use of “normal and routine military activities in conditions short of conflict to achieve strategic objectives,” has long served as an effective way to temporarily increase US force presence in critical regions. As Paparo has emphasized, regular and visible military campaigning in the Indo-Pacific remains essential to maintain credible deterrence and operational readiness.
As China accelerates its operational tempo around the Taiwan Strait, the Trump administration should consider adopting a policy of proportional response, increasing US campaigning activities in line with PLA escalations. A proportional approach would degrade China’s understanding of US operational patterns—complicating Beijing’s planning—and ensure that combat-capable forces are present west of the IDL when and where they are needed most.
However, sustaining a higher operational tempo will require significant diplomatic engagement and substantial logistical and financial resources, in addition to wear on the warfighters themselves. Despite these factors, a nonlinear 300 percent increase in Chinese military pressure over the past year demands a bold response. US President Donald Trump’s proposed one-trillion-dollar defense budget should prioritize funding for increased campaigning in the Indo-Pacific, recognizing that higher operational tempo directly improves both US lethality and readiness—two core criteria for strengthening deterrence under this administration.
One example of how increased campaigning enhances lethality is through its training value for both US and partner-nation forces. Campaigning-based exercises allow US warfighters to refine tactics, integrate new systems, and adapt to austere or degraded operational environments. Simultaneously, joint training with allies and partners strengthens the integration of weapon systems and military forces, reinforces defense diplomacy, and enhances collective deterrence across the region.
3. Increase US military presence in COFA nations
The recently renegotiated 2024 Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands reaffirm the United States’ responsibility to defend these nations and preserve exclusive access for US military forces. These agreements provide an opportunity to strengthen forward posture across the central and western Pacific.
Through the COFA structure, the Department of Defense should prioritize developing additional operational sites within the Freely Associated States (FAS). Pre-positioning forces, enhancing distributed basing, and expanding logistics hubs across the FAS would enable more flexible and resilient warfighting capabilities in proximity to the Taiwan Strait. The relatively permissive legal frameworks of the COFA agreements—coupled with the geographic advantage of the islands—make the FAS ideal locations for expanded US presence, including forces capable of dispersal and sustainment under contested conditions.
The so-called “Guam Cluster”—which includes the FAS—is the cornerstone of US defense architecture west of the IDL, and it is critical to sustainment in a future crisis. The United States should continue to invest political and military capital into reinforcing US access and capabilities in the FAS to deter Chinese aggression.
Dark clouds continue to gather on the Indo-Pacific horizon as the PLA modernizes and Xi continues to signal his ambition to unify the Taiwan Strait by any means necessary. In this environment, the credibility of US deterrence depends on the visible presence of capable military forces west of the IDL and their ability to respond with sufficient force. Lethality and visible presence matter.
As the Trump administration has acknowledged, credible deterrence—and, if necessary, victory—against China requires the active forward presence of combat-ready forces. Increasing US force posture in the Indo-Pacific through expanded presence agreements, intensified campaigning, and investment in the FAS will ensure the United States remains postured to respond swiftly and decisively to aggression.
