The responses of key U.S. allies – Japan, Australia, and the Philippines – to Washington’s maritime capability-commitment gap reflect the future of Indo-Pacific security.
The United States faces a dangerous strategic tangle in the Indo-Pacific growing security commitments and a diminishing capacity to meet the commitments. At the heart of this contradiction lies what can best be described as a “capability-commitment gap.” While the United States has strengthened security pledges to Indo-Pacific partners, its capacity to sustain this posture has deteriorated to crisis levels.
U.S. shipbuilding capacity now is just 0.1 percent the global market share, whereas China holds 46.6 percent of the market, which is causing a colossal difference in the capability to maintain naval power during any lengthy conflict. This is a kind of hollow naval power that is impressive on the outside, however, internally weak in the capacity which translate the technology into strategic impact.
This gap has been spotted by regional actors that are subject to every day Chinese operation in the gray zone. Instead of simply expressing their displeasure at their plight United States’ decline, they are creating different security structures and rethinking their roles within an order that is that is no longer controlled by a single maritime power. It’s not simply a fracture in the U.S. hub-and-spoke system of alliances but rather the creation of an “latticework” of interlocking security relations with responsibilities that are distributed.
The responses of key U.S. allies – Japan, Australia, and the Philippines – to Washington’s maritime capability-commitment gap reveal significant insights about the future of Indo-Pacific security. Although the gap poses serious risk, it has resulted in the development of a more interconnected security system that could be more resilient than the system it’s replacing. The ability of this new framework to effectively stop Chinese attacks remains an unanswered issue. It is, however, the largest change to Security arrangements in the region since closing in the Cold War.
The Scale of Maritime Decline
Understanding the full implications of the U.S. capability-commitment gap in the Indo-Pacific requires grasping the unprecedented scale of its maritime industrial decline. According to an U.S. Navy estimate, ” China has 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States.” This disparity isn’t just a matter of academics; it could result in strategic implications for any conflict that lasts long. The power of the maritime sector is primarily dependent on industrial capability. Contrary to land warfare in which armies are able to be regrouped but naval defeats usually cause the permanent loss of large vessels which take years to replace.
Technology alone is not enough to offset the disadvantages of industrial capacity in shipping competition. Even modern vessels need replacement after being damaged or destroyed and China’s advantages in manufacturing directly address. Hull count is crucial in long-term operations. China’s capacity of replenishing lost losses at over 230 times that of the U.S. rate creates an unsustainable asymmetry during any long-term conflict. Additionally, China has significantly narrowed the technological gap in crucial areas such as anti-ship missiles and underwater capabilities, and is able to maintain an overwhelming capacity for production, and mixing quantity with increasingly similar quality.
The reasons for the decline are complex and go back to post-Cold War period in which consolidation of defense and globalization sucked up and degraded the U.S. shipbuilding workforce and infrastructure. Meanwhile it appears that the United States faces a dangerous transitional period during where its strategic goals are growing to surpass its ability to sustain them.
Its implications on Indo-Pacific security are huge. In the past, U.S. naval dominance offered both deterrence against aggression as well as reassurance for allies. This foundation is being eroded precisely at the time that tensions in the region are increasing. The most important thing to consider is what this gap in capability can mean for deterrence over a longer period of time. The legitimacy that comes with U.S. security guarantees has been based on ability and will. While the political aspect remains open to discussion, the capacity aspect has unmistakable physical constraints.
Japan’s response United States’ maritime decline is perhaps the largest change in the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia since World War II. After being enslaved by its pacifist constitution and content that fell under the U.S. security umbrella, Japan is now undergoing an extensive re-evaluation of its defense strategy.
After a long period of keeping defense expenditures at a lower level than 1.5% of their GDP Japan is now committed to increasing the defence budget up to 2 percent in 2027. The most important aspect is the method by which the funds are allocated in the first place. Japan is continuously developing capabilities that will complement decreasing U.S. maritime capability, such as anti-ship missiles and maritime patrol aircrafts along with submarine-based capabilities. In addition, Japan has changed its constitution to allow “counterstrike capabilities,” allowing the country to strike at the bases of adversaries in the event of an attack.
More than just hardware Tokyo has begun to rethink its strategy partnerships. While retaining its U.S. alliance as the foundation of its security plan, Japan has been seeking new security partnerships, like those with Australia and the Philippines. RAA of 2022 (RAA) which is signed between Australia along with 2024’s 2024 RAA with the Philippines the first of Japan’s agreement of this kind in Asia. This provides a framework for Japanese personnel and equipment to support the Philippines during times of crisis within areas like the South China Sea.
Australia’s response to strategic threats is different from Japan’s, yet it shares similar fundamental concerns. The country has historically relied upon U.S. naval power while focussing on land troops, Australia is rapidly pivoting towards a defense oriented toward maritime which serves as an insurance policy from U.S. decline and a complement to the larger regional security structure.
The underlying principle of Australia’s strategy lies in its AUKUS agreement that is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom which will provide subs powered by nuclear energy to the Royal Australian Navy. By the pact committing itself to nuclear propulsion technology, Australia is positioning itself to take on more responsibility for deep-ocean deterrence operations previously handled through authorities like the U.S. Navy’s attack submarine fleet, precisely in the areas where the United States’ industrial limitations are the most severe.
What makes Australia’s strategy unique is its focus on maintaining its strategic depth through diverse relations. Australia has stepped up its security cooperation with Japan by executing joint exercises to strengthen the maritime defense without directly U.S. facilitation. This hedge extends to Australia’s defense industry base, with substantial investment in shipbuilding capabilities within the country and alliances throughout the region.
The Philippines’ Front-Line Dilemma
Perhaps no country better exemplifies the consequences of the United States’ capability-commitment gap than the Philippines. It is located at the intersection between South China Sea disputes and with limited defense capabilities in its own country The Philippines has to contend against Chinese maritime coercion, while also navigating the uncertainty of the decline of its maritime ally.
The Philippines’ front-line status was clearly demonstrated in recent conflicts in Second Thomas Shoal. The incident occurred in the month of March in 2024 China Coast Guard members of the China Coast Guard conducted dangerous actions and fired water cannons to attack an Philippine ship that was supplying the Philippines, causing small injuries for seven members of the crew. These incidents occurred in spite of U.S. naval forces in the region, which reveals China’s belief that an U.S. presence in the region would not be a direct threat.
The President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has adopted a multifaceted response that combines enhanced U.S. cooperation, diversified security alliances, and emerging capabilities development. The underlying principle of this is the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement ( EDCA), which has grown by five-to-9 locations to accommodate U.S. forces that rotate and includes bases with a view of towards the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
Conscient of the risks in relying entirely upon U.S. capacity, the Philippines has pursued aggressively security relations to other powers in the region. They have announced three-way coastguard exercises in conjunction with Japan, the U.S. and Japan and strengthening the military partnership with Australia.
