There is debate as to whether Myanmar’s military junta is on the verge of collapse, with some dismissing proclamations of a “tipping point” as premature or wishful thinking. But Myanmar, thrown into turmoil by a military coup in February 2021, passed that threshold in October 2023.
Driven by a commitment to freedom and a federal democratic future, resistance forces are more determined than ever. China’s support for the junta has reframed their struggle as not only a fight against domestic oppression but also a defense against foreign encroachment, deepening their resolve to reclaim the nation.
Operation 1027, staged by the Brotherhood Alliance, irreversibly changed the course of the conflict in the resistance’s favor, marking a culmination of successful defiance. The operation in Myanmar’s northern Shan State featured multiple deployments, including at the Battle of Lashio in August 2024, and exposed the junta’s structural rot, while inspiring disparate armed resistance forces throughout Myanmar to confront their oppressor.
The opposition groups relied on popular resistance and grassroots mobilization. They gained ground as junta forces suffered battlefield attrition, declining morale, increased defections and surrenders, and waning public support.
By mid-2024, the junta had lost control of more than 100 towns nationwide. It recaptured seven, some with China’s direct support, the Reuters news agency reported in March 2025. Junta chief Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and his military leaders faced a choice: surrender to the resistance or to Beijing. They chose the latter.
In an unprecedented break from decades of Myanmar military doctrine, Min Aung Hlaing authorized private security company (PSC) forces from China to operate inside the country. PSCs are state-owned enterprises staffed by former Chinese People’s Liberation Army officers.
In Pakistan, PSCs secure segments of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gwadar port. In Laos, PSCs guard the Boten-Vientiane railway. In Cambodia, China’s security forces protect assets in special economic zones such as Sihanoukville. Across these cases, Beijing’s purported private security apparatus establishes geopolitical control, subordinating host nation sovereignty to China’s interests.
The junta’s entanglement with illicit enterprises further illustrates its decay. Criminal networks flourish under its protection, posing regional threats and corroding the rule of law. For example, one of Southeast Asia’s largest scam centers operates in Myanmar’s Karen State, along the border with Thailand. It engages in human trafficking, forced labor and cyber fraud, stealing billions of dollars from victims worldwide. The United States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the operation in September 2025.
While China publicly pressured Thailand to dismantle the operation, privately it helped the scam center operators avoid enforcement, witnesses said.
Battle for legitimacy
The resistance movement enjoys broad public support. While Min Aung Hlaing and his military had unfavorable ratings of 80% and 77%, respectively, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the ousted leader of Myanmar’s democratically elected government, had a favorable rating of 67%, according to a 2025 survey by the research group Blue Shirt Initiative, which seeks to build democratic values in Myanmar.
As the junta escalates its offensives and intensifies bombings of civilian targets — including schools, clinics, churches and monasteries — public hatred toward the regime hardens. Yet even while committing such atrocities, the junta orchestrates humanitarian gestures and diplomatic overtures to gain international legitimacy.
For example, the junta wants to replace Myanmar’s United Nations ambassador, appointed by the pre-coup civilian government, with its own candidate. Meanwhile, it restricts passports and visas to prevent resistance leaders from traveling. This allows coup leaders to block opposition diplomacy, even as it isolates the population domestically.
A planned scam election in December 2025 is part of this theater. With opposition leaders jailed, the National League for Democracy political party disbanded and conditions generally repressive, there is no possibility of a free or fair contest.
Unsustainable Military Surge
As of September 2025, junta forces were engaged in offensives across 15 fronts, deploying forced conscripts and conducting assaults with drones, artillery and air support. But this is unsustainable. The resistance had retreated tactically in several areas — not from weakness, but from China’s pressure and the junta’s short-term show of force ahead of the December election.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has emerged as a critical counterweight to China’s pressure. In early 2025, it seized control of key rare-earth mineral mines along the Myanmar-China border, facilities vital to China’s supply chains for defense and technology. The seizure gave the KIA leverage over Beijing while depriving the junta of vital revenue and border control.
Meanwhile, another major ethnic resistance organization, the Arakan Army, has been advancing in Rakhine State, where it hopes to gain control of Kyauk Phyu, a strategically vital town on the Bay of Bengal. Kyauk Phyu hosts oil and gas pipelines and a seaport critical to China’s One Belt, One Road infrastructure scheme. It also provides direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.
The loss of Kyauk Phyu would be devastating to the junta and China.
If successful, such developments would present a new strategic outlook. The KIA’s control of mineral resources in the north and the Arakan Army’s offensive in the west represent a pincer movement that could snatch critical geopolitical and economic levers from the junta and its foreign patrons. The acquisitions would show the resistance has evolved from a reactive insurgency into a savvy coalition engaged in denial and deterrence operations.
Myanmar is a pivotal arena where authoritarianism, corruption, organized transnational crime and foreign domination collide with democracy and grassroots resistance.
The junta cannot sustain its current approach indefinitely, though continued support from China could extend its survival. The shape of what comes next is uncertain, but a free and democratic Myanmar is the most effective defense against China’s strategic advance. The stakes reverberate far beyond Myanmar and could shape regional stability, strategic competition and the global balance of power.
