As tensions rise across the Taiwan Strait, the policy debate in Washington remains fractured. U.S. strategy broadly revolves around deterring China from attacking Taiwan, and for the past three presidential administrations, it has consisted of three central components: increasing the ability of the United States and Taiwan to defend the island militarily; using diplomacy to signal U.S. resolve to protect Taiwan while also reassuring China that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence; and using economic pressure to slow China’s military modernization efforts.
But there is little consensus on the right balance among these three components—and that balance determines to some degree how deterrence looks in practice. Some contend that diplomatic pressure—along with military restraint, to avoid antagonizing China—will keep Beijing at bay. Others warn that unless Washington significantly strengthens its military posture in Asia, deterrence will collapse. And a third approach, outlined recently in Foreign Affairs by Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim, emphasizes that bolstering Taiwan’s self-defense and enabling offshore U.S. support is the best route to sustaining deterrence while also mitigating the risk of escalation.
These prescriptions have merit but fall short of grappling with the paradox at the heart of U.S. strategy: deterrence can fail in two ways. Do too little, and Beijing may gamble it can seize Taiwan before Washington is able to respond. Do too much, and Chinese leaders may conclude that force is the only remaining path to unification. Navigating this dilemma requires more than a stronger military or bolder diplomacy. It requires a calibrated strategy of rearmament, reassurance, and restraint that threads the needle between weakness and recklessness. Combined properly, forward-deployed capabilities, diplomatic restraint, and selective economic interdependence can reinforce one another to maintain credible deterrence while avoiding provocation.
So far, however, the Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan has veered between harsh transactionalism, such as the imposition of a 32 percent tariff on most Taiwanese goods last month, and quiet reaffirmations of support for Taipei through bipartisan visits and a pause on the highest tariffs. The administration still has time to settle on a coherent strategy, but the window of opportunity is closing.
Currently, the U.S. military is improving its force posture in the vicinity of Taiwan, most notably through expanded access to bases in the Philippines and by reinforcing capabilities in southwestern Japan and the broader western Pacific. In the Philippines, thanks to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the United States gained access to four new strategic sites, bringing the total there to nine. Several, such as those in Cagayan and Isabela Provinces, are just a few hundred miles from Taiwan.
The story is similar in Japan’s case. Washington and Tokyo agreed in 2023 to restructure the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa from the artillery-focused 12th Marine Regiment, part of a force of roughly 18,000 marines stationed in Japan, into a 2,000-strong Marine Littoral Regiment, a quick-reaction force designed to operate along the so-called first island chain encompassing Indonesia, Japan, portions of the Philippines, and Taiwan. To complement this effort, the U.S. military has increased joint military exercises and expanded integrated air and missile defense systems across allied territories.
But U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific need more than just quantitative upgrades; they require qualitative shifts to be able to block China from forcibly unifying with Taiwan. The United States needs a greater forward presence in the region, as well as specific capabilities that would prevent an invading force from making its way across the Taiwan Strait, such as strategic bombers, submarines, and antiship missiles. Once those were deployed, they would also require significant operational flexibility. For example, Washington should prioritize securing forward-deployed submarine tenders in Japan and the Philippines to enable submarines to reload, resupply, and rearm without returning to Guam or Hawaii. And it should work to establish permanent bomber bases in Australia and the Philippines and deploy antiship missile systems in Japan’s southwestern islands and the northern Philippines.
