Force Design, originally known as Force Design 2030, is a restructuring initiative by the United States Marine Corps aimed at modernizing its combat capabilities to address future near-peer adversary conflicts. Introduced in March 2020 by General David H. Berger, the plan focuses on preparing the Marine Corps for potential naval warfare against near-peer adversaries, such as China. Key goals include enhancing collaboration with the U.S. Navy, transitioning to a more amphibious and agile strike force, and modernizing equipment.
The initiative involves significant structural changes, such as phasing out tanks and replacing artillery with rockets. Its implementation began shortly after its introduction, with structural modifications and modernization efforts gradually rolled out over the following years. Force Design 2030 has sparked a mix of support and criticism. Many seasoned and experienced Marines have raised concerns about its impact on the Corps’ traditional combined-arms capabilities and global crisis response readiness.
The initiative risks diminishing the Marine Corps’ ability to operate as a versatile air-ground-logistics team. Divesting specific capabilities, such as tanks, to fund experimental technologies leaves the Corps less prepared to address current threats. General Berger’s plan equates to a Forlorn Hope for all who would be placed in harm’s way, abandoned from a logistical train necessary to carry out the mission and proper lines of retreat and communication. The danger now is that, with competing threats, the demands on the Marine Corps will increase, and the operating environments will become more diverse. Force Design 2030 is now more dangerous than it was two years ago. With new threats contesting strategic transit areas worldwide, the danger is greater than ever. Ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship weapons systems, as well as area denial capabilities, are becoming increasingly critical.
The near-peer threat of China’s aspirations towards reunification with Taiwan has American and allied forces laser-focused on the regional and global implications and ramifications of such an event. The new strategy correctly models a complete mix of platforms and weapons systems. However, it falls short in the small-unit tactics necessary to achieving deterrence and enhancing warfighting capacity.
If the Marine Corps is to be operationally ready to conduct anti-access/area denial operations, it appears to have overlooked critical components of operational practice. The staff functions of intelligence, deployment, sustainment, command, and control are interrupted when hostilities begin. The platforms these littoral combat teams will operate are limited in size and means of ingress/egress. The conceptual and physical links between strategy and tactics are mainly absent. There is a tendency to apply the operational practice to large-scale operations and meet strength with strength through the conduct of offensive operations. If Marines are to focus on anti-access and area denial from island platforms, lighter combat teams will be needed. Those same teams will be required to conduct operations that do not appear sustainable. The combat load for a typical Marine in this environment can be appreciably more considerable than that of a more conventional mission, incorporating the additional weight of anti-ship weapons, navigation systems, communication systems, and potentially scuba equipment and small boats must be considered.
These small-unit tactics will combine reconnaissance and intelligence gathering with the ability to deploy immediate weapon capability and avenues of communication and retreat. This begs the question of what steps are being taken to assure Marines that their missions are not one-and-done events. The plan lacks practical considerations, including local conditions, terrain, freshwater, and, most importantly, the native peoples. The latter can be an asset or a liability.
The cornerstone of America’s continued military preeminence is our ability to project power rapidly and virtually unimpeded to widespread areas of the globe. If Berger’s littoral teams are to be mobile, agile, and quickly redeployed, how do we maintain and preserve that constant and persistent presence? Despite the apparent danger of precision weapons and naval bombardment, the Marine Corps is ignoring that China has already considered the question of area denial. Further, it should be suspected and preparations made for the idea that China is already infiltrating local populations and initiating insurgent plans for their version of asymmetrical warfare.
Judgment and criticism of Berger’s Force Design should be tempered against the overwhelming fact that new American militarism embodies a false sense of capability and superiority. Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look after we abandoned Afghanistan and the new near-peer threats of China and Russia.
After over forty years focused on Southwest Asia and a preceding 30 years focused on Southeast Asia, the American military is faced with fighting a war they have not considered or contemplated in their training and strategic focus since World War II. The Marine Corps must focus on a highly maneuverable force that can serve as an early warning force through forward observation posts and with the capability to engage warships with shore-to-ship weapons. While no one questions the Marine Corps’ ability to engage with and destroy the enemy, we cannot lose sight of the Marine Corps’ dependence on logistical and operational support. The answer will not lie in the forward deployed units and over-the-horizon response but in area denial through a robust naval presence. Equal power struggles to co-exist in a limited space without confrontation, and conflict is not likely. Force Design 2030 needs to be retooled quickly to provide a cohesive Naval solution for our national security in the South China Sea.
The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) has undergone significant transformation in recent years through its Force Design 2030 initiative, aimed at adapting to modern warfare challenges, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, where China’s military rise is a key concern. Here’s a breakdown of the relationship between the USMC, China, and Force Design:
1. Force Design 2030: A Shift in USMC Strategy
- Goal: Restructure the Marine Corps to be more agile, expeditionary, and capable of operating in contested environments (like the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait).
- Key Changes:
- Reduction in traditional forces: Cut tanks, some infantry units, and aviation assets to focus on littoral (coastal) warfare.
- Stand-up of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs): Small, mobile units equipped with anti-ship missiles (e.g., Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System—NMESIS) to support naval operations.
- Emphasis on long-range precision fires: Investing in missiles like the Tomahawk and Naval Strike Missile (NSM) to counter Chinese naval power.
- Distributed Operations: Moving away from large, centralized forces to smaller, dispersed units that can operate in denied environments.
2. China as the Primary Strategic Challenge
- The USMC’s restructuring is largely driven by China’s military modernization, including:
- A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) capabilities: China’s missile systems (e.g., DF-21D “carrier-killer”), advanced air defenses, and naval expansion threaten U.S. power projection.
- South China Sea militarization: China’s artificial islands and military bases complicate U.S. freedom of navigation.
- Taiwan contingency: The USMC must be prepared to support Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion, requiring rapid, stealthy, and resilient forces.
3. How Force Design Counters China
- Littoral Mobility: MLRs can operate from small islands and shorelines, making them harder to target.
- Anti-Ship Capabilities: Marines will help the Navy control sea lanes by threatening Chinese ships with long-range missiles.
- Alliance Strengthening: The USMC is increasing cooperation with allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines to counter China’s influence.
4. Controversies & Criticisms
- Too focused on China? Some argue Force Design neglects other threats (e.g., Russia, Middle East conflicts).
- Risk of over-specialization: Cutting heavy armor and infantry may limit the Corps’ versatility in other conflicts.
- Feasibility concerns: Distributed operations rely on secure communications and logistics, which China could disrupt.
5. China’s Response
- China views U.S. military adjustments, including Force Design, as part of containment efforts.
- The PLA is likely developing countermeasures, such as improved ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) to track small Marine units.
Conclusion
The USMC’s Force Design 2030 is a direct response to China’s growing military threat, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. By becoming a lighter, more mobile, and missile-centric force, the Marines aim to play a crucial role in deterring or defeating Chinese aggression while supporting broader U.S. Integrated Deterrence strategies.
