US President Donald Trump is certainly not afraid of an executive order, signing 97 since his inauguration on 20 January. In minerals and energy, Trump has declared a national emergency; committed to unleashing US (particularly Alaskan) resource potential; and established the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC), granting it considerable executive powers.
His latest minerals order, titled ‘Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production’, aims to overhaul US domestic production and reshape domestic and international critical mineral supply chains. It could derail Australia’s efforts for greater domestic production in the process.
At the strategic level, Trump wants to end US reliance on Chinese and adversarial mineral supplies and massively boost US production for national security and economic gains. While there is room for international partners to assist, the order is clearly aligned with the Trump’s broader America First approach.
Operationally, the US government will attempt to unlock mineral and energy production by administratively and financially prioritising new and existing projects and slashing regulatory red tape across critical minerals, uranium, and other commodities.
This will occur across the supply chain, targeting ‘mineral production’ encapsulating mining, processing, refining and end-use manufacturing in technological productions, including semiconductors, permanent magnets, and electric vehicles.
Executive orders are designed for immediate effect. Trump’s minerals order is no different, outlining near immediate actions for departmental heads and agencies. Much of it overseen by the NEDC.
For example, within 10 days of signing, agencies involved in mine production permitting are to produce a list of viable projects to prioritise. In the following 10 days, the Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, through his role as NEDC chair, will select priority projects for immediate approval.
Similarly, legislative reform to mine waste disposal and treatment—presumably reducing environmental protections—is ordered to be introduced to congress within 30 days of signing.
Alongside Burgum as NEDC chair and Secretary of the Interior, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright are tasked with significant decision-making across new investments and project prioritisation.
Project prioritisation, expedited approvals, and expedited delivery of supporting infrastructure are the primary levers through which Trump aims to unlock US mineral production. Achieving each will likely come at cost of environmental and social protections.
Whether it achieves rapid overall production increases remains to be seen.
According to S&P data, US mines have an average lead time of 13 years. Discovery and exploration studies account for the largest proportion at 8.7 years on average. Rapid permits should reduce the lag time between the completion of feasibility studies and mine construction, but it will not open new mines overnight.
Commercial factors, technical and financial feasibility, and major financing hurdles must also be considered. Trump’s slate of mineral and energy orders contain some measures to increase financial support to domestic mining and processing projects, including directing the International Development Finance Corporation to distribute more domestic funding. But doing so quickly and efficiently will test the US government. Industry, additionally, will most likely want to see sustained policy commitment and market effects before investing into new capital intensive projects.
Moving forward there will be opportunities for Australia to grasp, as well as risks to manage.
Several Australian mining companies are already operating or proposing government-supported processing plants in the United States. This includes Lynas Rare Earths’ refinery in Texas, Syrah Resources’ graphite refinery in Louisiana and South 32’s potential battery-grade manganese plant fed by its new Hermosa mine in Arizona. These projects could become important linkages in the sector and may benefit from these recent reforms.
The US will also remain reliant on international supply for some minerals and will need to prioritise close international partners with large mineral deposits, such as Australia.
The US has already demonstrated its willingness to provide generous concessional loans and fund minerals processing projects. The financing provisions of the minerals order will create further opportunities while increasing competitive pressure on Australia—particularly regarding our Future Made in Australia aspirations.
But there are risks to Australia’s ability to compete. Faster approvals and greater government funding commitments may draw investment to the US rather than Australia. However, poor implementation or environmental and social backlash may undermine this competitive advantage.
Australia should be most concerned if the US successfully expands its raw outputs quicker than its downstream industry, as US mineral production could flood the market. In 2024, Australia saw similar effects of oversupply in the nickel market (largely due to Indonesia), leading to temporary shuttering of nearly all Australian nickel operations.
Australia will need to assess the risks presented by US production increases. The government must work with industry to protect our domestic production and assess whether demand-side policy responses, such as a national stockpile, will be needed.
Trump’s mineral policy puts America first. Australia must respond and engage directly with the US to negotiate collaboration and maintain fairness in the market. International forums, such as ASPI’s Darwin Dialogue, may become particularly important to achieving this.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals could potentially impact Australian exporters, given Australia’s significant role in global mineral supply chains. The order, designed to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign supplies—particularly from China—might disrupt existing trade dynamics, including Australia’s exports of rare earths, lithium, and other strategic minerals to the U.S.
Potential Impacts on Australian Interests:
- Market Competition:
- If the U.S. prioritizes domestic mining and processing, Australian firms could face reduced demand for their exports.
- American subsidies for local production might undercut Australian suppliers on price.
- Trade Diversion:
- The U.S. may seek alternative suppliers or ramp up domestic production, affecting Australia’s market share.
- Australia has been a key supplier of lithium (essential for batteries) and rare earth elements (crucial for defense tech), but the U.S. may look inward or to other allies.
- Investment Shifts:
- U.S. incentives for domestic mining could divert investment away from Australian projects.
- Joint ventures between U.S. and Australian firms might be restructured in favor of American operations.
- Geopolitical Considerations:
- Australia has been a strong U.S. ally in securing critical mineral supply chains, but Trump’s “America First” approach could sideline even partners.
- If the U.S. imposes stricter “Buy American” rules, Australian miners may need to pivot more toward Asian markets, particularly China—which could create diplomatic tensions with Washington.
Possible Australian Responses:
- Diversifying Trade Partners: Strengthening ties with the EU, Japan, and South Korea to offset any U.S. demand reduction.
- Enhancing Domestic Processing: Moving up the value chain by refining more minerals locally rather than exporting raw materials.
- Lobbying for Exemptions: Seeking carve-outs in U.S. policies given Australia’s status as a strategic ally.
Conclusion:
While Trump’s policy aims to bolster U.S. supply chain resilience, it may inadvertently strain trade relations with Australia. Canberra will need to navigate carefully, balancing its economic interests with its strategic alliance with Washington. The long-term impact depends on how strictly the U.S. enforces domestic preferences and whether Australia can adapt to shifting global demand.
