A Lee Jae-myung presidency will complicate the political landscape in East Asia, forcing Trump to prioritize which security threat to address first: North Korea or China.
South Korea’s Constitutional Court continues to consider the impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk-yeol over his declaration of martial law in December. If the impeachment is upheld, a new presidential election will be held within 60 days – likely in May or June.
Unless an unexpected event occurs, Lee Jae-Myung from the opposition Democratic Party is likely to become the next president of South Korea. This prospect has raised concerns in Washington, as Lee is a left-leaning politician – and South Korea’s liberals are typically viewed as less reliable partners in the United States.
For example, the Congressional Research Service noted last December that Lee had repeatedly questioned the us-against-them diplomacy of the Yoon administration. Lee has accused Yoon of being overly friendly toward the United States while displaying blatant hostility toward China and North Korea.
In early January, Republican Representative Young Kim expressed her discontent with South Korea’s opposition parties, which have “accused [Yoon] of antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia, isolating South Korea within Northeast Asia, and being too pro-Japan.” Kim’s remarks were indirectly aimed at Lee, a central figure in the opposition.
These criticisms should be understood in context, however. A Lee presidency will present both opportunities and challenges for U.S. President Donald Trump.
The first opportunity for Trump is the possibility to use Lee as a middleman between Washington and Pyongyang. During his first term, Trump held three summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, facilitated largely by then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
Trump recognized Moon’s left-leaning political stance but respected his diplomatic abilities. Meanwhile, Kim viewed Moon as a reliable mediator. Moon worked diligently to persuade Kim to engage in talks with Trump, understanding that these two leaders needed to reconcile their political differences to foster peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Lee, due to his left-leaning orientation, is unlikely to antagonize Kim. He is expected to treat the North Korean as a political partner, working toward mutual coexistence. Such an approach starkly contrasts with that of Yoon, who considers Kim a sworn enemy and has refused to engage in open dialogue while instead focusing almost exclusively on increasing military deterrence.
Since Kim is aware of Lee’s political views, he is likely to accept Lee as a middleman between Washington and Pyongyang, similar to the role former President Moon played. This suggests that Lee could be an asset to Trump in managing security risks posed by the nuclear-armed state, rather than a liability.
The second benefit of a liberal president is that the Trump administration would be less worried about South Korea going nuclear.
Trump’s comment on his inauguration day, referring to North Korea as a nuclear power, has deepened concerns among South Koreans about Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities. As a result, many Koreans are urging their leaders not to rely on the United States’ nuclear umbrella but to develop their own nuclear arsenal as a counterbalance to the North. As of January 28, 74 percent of South Koreans supported the idea of their country developing nuclear weapons if Trump were to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, either implicitly or explicitly.
