China is trying to gain more influence in Kiribati but has yet to fully consolidate it. While Australia should seize this very last moment to counter China’s efforts, it should ensure it does so in partnership with Kiribati.
The balance of influence on Kiribati between Australia and China has been shifting. Tarawa has deepened ties with Beijing since resuming diplomatic relations in 2019, most recently discussing collaboration on deep-sea mining. Then, in 2024, Kiribati initially opted out of Australia’s Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) and had a diplomatic row with New Zealand last year. Australia should be concerned, given Kiribati’s strategically important location in the Pacific and issues of government transparency.
Kiribati exemplifies the underestimated influence of microstates in shaping the international agenda, especially on environmental and nuclear issues. Its geographically significant exclusive economic zone spans 3.5 million square km and is crossed by nine undersea cables connecting the United States with Southeast Asia and Australia.
Kiribati’s location has long been of interest to China. It maintained a satellite station in Tarawa until Kiribati made the diplomatic switch to Taiwan in 2003. China is also aware that Kiribati is close to US and French territories as well as key military bases, and sits on potential supply routes should a crisis break out in East Asia. Observers say China may invest in a runway on Kanton Island, in competition with Australian and US interests.
Recently, Beijing has been leveraging its full arsenal to interfere in Kiribati’s domestic affairs. It donated books about China’s successes to the parliament library. Chinese diplomats were seen near parliament just before its opaque adjournment in 2019 following the sudden restoration of diplomatic relations. The Chinese embassy in Kiribati demonstrates respect and care through visits and donations, coordinating the docking of the Chinese military’s hospital ship in Tarawa in 2023, as well as building a park and funding grass-root groups and non-governmental organisations.
China is also active in Kiribati’s fishing industry, through joint ventures of companies based in Fiji or related to Chinese state-owned enterprises. In 2024, the Environmental Justice Foundation reported illegal trans-shipments in Kiribati waters by fleets operated by Chinese firm Zhejiang Ocean Family.
Additionally, Chinese police continue to operate in Kiribati. It remains unclear how exactly they are assisting their local counterparts and what they are gaining in return.
Democracy in Kiribati is challenged by the Chinese influence. Despite regular elections, Kiribati ranked ninth out of 12 in the 2023 Pacific Islands Media Freedom Index. In 2024 elections, opposition leader Tessie Lambourne – a former ambassador to Taipei – was unable to challenge the president. In her constituency, she faced a former minister and an unknown schoolteacher. The teacher unexpectedly received significant campaign funding and got the most votes.
Despite China’s efforts to seek influence in Kiribati, it faces several challenges. An educated elite emerging from Kiribati’s top universities may work to reduce the risk of manipulation. Throughout history Kiribati has switched diplomatic partners as needed. It recognised the People’s Republic of China in 1980, but switched diplomatic recognition to Taiwan in 2003 before switching back to China in 2019. And Kiribati has not yet fallen into the Chinese debt trap, as is clear from the Pacific Aid Map.
China also faces competition from other countries. Its increase in aid to Kiribati since 2019 has been effective, but has attracted Western interest. Australia ramped up its own engagement by training Kiribati’s police force and visiting the outer islands more frequently. In February, an Australian pacific support vessel delivered humanitarian assistance to Banaba Island. Last year, France sent its joint commander for Asia Pacific to Tarawa for a visit, and later set up collaborative training sessions, patrols and infrastructure renovation projects.
Kiribati remains dependent on foreign support and vulnerable to influence, with the lowest GDP per capita in the Pacific and aid accounting for 18 percent of national income. Australia must continue to monitor developments in Kiribati, and it could consider countering Beijing’s influence by signing a bilateral agreement similar to those recently signed with Tuvalu, Nauru and Papua New Guinea.
Events are moving in a promising direction. Kiribati was eventually included in the second round for Australia’s PEV eligibility last August, while Kiribati and New Zealand signed a partnership agreement earlier this year. Australia should build on this momentum to limit Chinese influence with the support of other like-minded states.