While China has begun to put pressure on Iran to end its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, its statements have been carefully worded, experts say, showing how the prolonged conflict is testing Beijing’s relationship with Tehran.
President Xi Jinping told Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman last week that China wanted an “immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” and explicitly demanded that the waterway “ remain open to normal passage”, without naming Iran or the US.
Speaking at the United Nations earlier this month, Chinese ambassador Fu Cong was more explicit. While condemning the US and Israeli strikes on Iran as violations of the UN Charter, he pointedly declared that “China does not go along with Iran’s attacks on Gulf states and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.”
He added that China hoped “peace and stability will be restored to the strait as soon as possible and navigation will resume”, while urging Iran to halt attacks on “relevant facilities” in the Persian Gulf and restore normal navigation.
These statements mark some of Beijing’s most direct public distancing from Iran’s retaliatory actions during the conflict. They show the delicate balance Beijing is striking between rhetorical solidarity with Tehran and its huge economic and energy interests in the region, according to observers.
Zhu Yongbiao, a Middle East expert and director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at Lanzhou University, said China’s position remained “consistent and coherent”, but Fu’s remarks underlined Beijing’s growing concerns about Iran’s behaviour.
The prolonged blockade had created “abnormal conditions”, severely disrupted global energy markets and caused unpredictable knock-on effects, he noted.
He argued this approach was actually harmful for Iran, as it “creates enemies, worsens its external environment, and undermines efforts to resolve disputes”.
Zhu emphasised Fu’s deliberate choice of the phrase “does not go along with Iran’s attacks” as falling short of outright opposition, reflecting continuity rather than a policy shift.
He argued that the conflict had exposed the limits of Iran’s foreign policy.
Despite the 25-year cooperation agreement signed with China in 2021, ties remained constrained by Western sanctions and Tehran’s “lack of strategic clarity”, Zhu said.
“This indecision is a clear weakness in the relationship. The problem lies not in China’s reciprocity, but in Iran’s uncertainty in policy and diplomatic choices.”
Still, he argued that the war “will not fundamentally weaken” the two countries’ cooperation.
“China and Iran remain complementary in many areas. Whatever the outcome, the relationship will not be weaker than before the war,” Zhu said, attributing this resilience partly to China’s growing energy autonomy through domestic production and deployment of renewable energy infrastructure.
China buys nearly 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports. But trade remains modest overall, at about US$10 billion in 2025, far smaller than China’s trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, each exceeding US$100 billion.
Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal, a scholar at the International Institute for Iranian Studies, a Riyadh-based think tank, described China-Iran ties as “significant but limited”, and increasingly shaped by asymmetry.
“China has long viewed Iran as a useful partner in the Middle East; however, Iran has never been the centre of Beijing’s regional strategy. Instead, China has increasingly pursued a diversified strategy, maintaining engagement with Iran while expanding relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states,” he wrote in a report published earlier this month.
Moonakal noted that the 25-year agreement had remained “loosely defined and limited in execution”.
China has repeatedly condemned US and Israeli strikes and called for restraint and dialogue, but it has avoided major arms shipments or direct military involvement, reflecting what he called “a strategy of calibrated ambiguity, maximising influence while limiting exposure”.
He cautioned that China’s ties with Iran would also be shaped by how other partners perceived Beijing’s risk-averse approach.
“Iran poses a growing concern; if Tehran continues to escalate attacks on Gulf countries, it could directly threaten Chinese investments and energy security. In this sense, Iran risks becoming a liability for China, potentially complicating Beijing’s ability to continue its long-standing approach and strategy.”