Revisions to defence export controls adopted by Japan’s cabinet today demonstrate the urgency with which Tokyo is shaking up its post-war defence settings in the face of increasing international insecurity. This is good news for Australia and other countries invested in the rules-based order.
Australia could learn from Japan’s approach as it pursues what Canberra is calling the self-reliance policy outlined in last week’s National Defence Strategy, which involves the concurrent strengthening of national capability and international partnerships, including the US alliance.
The updated version of Japan’s Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and related implementation guidelines authorises exportation of any type of finished defence product, removing the previous limitation to five non-lethal categories: rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping.
Australia is among 17 countries that already have the necessary defence agreements in place to receive weaponry from Japan under the new guidelines, alongside other key partners such as the US and Britain. These agreements require countries to keep the weapons and technological knowledge they receive secure and to use them in accordance with the UN Charter. Countries that don’t yet have such arrangements could still receive non-lethal equipment.
Countries at war remain barred from receiving defence transfers, but exceptions can be approved by the National Security Council in limited circumstances relating to Japan’s security. In practice, Tokyo is unlikely to allow anything to hinder the US alliance under the new policy, but assistance to countries less directly connected to Japan’s security, such as Ukraine, may remain capped at the non-lethal level.
Several Indo-Pacific countries are tipped to receive Japanese arms by sale or donation. The revisions could smooth the transfer of Japan’s retiring Abukuma-class destroyers and TC-90 surveillance aircraft to the Philippines, as well as more modern equipment, such as Type 3 air-defence missiles. Indonesia is also interested in Japanese kit. New Zealand, which is yet to sign the partnership agreement with Japan needed for finished weaponry, is considering following Australia by acquiring a version of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Mogami-class frigate.
There is no suggestion that Tokyo is considering arms transfers to Taiwan, with which it lacks diplomatic relations.
Japan’s defence export overhaul comes within days of Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles meeting in Melbourne to finalise the contracts and memorandums for Australia to acquire 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates. The Mogami deal hasn’t relied on Tokyo changing its export controls, as there was already leeway for transfers involving joint development and production, as will be present in the frigate program.
Even so, today’s announcement complements the frigates deal and will help create the ‘seamless defence industrial base between our two countries’ that Marles described in Melbourne at a joint press conference with Koizumi on 18 April. Seamless cooperation needs to open markets in both countries and support the co-production of equipment that might be exported to other trusted partners. The test case could be an ANZAC version of the upgraded Mogami, if it is selected for New Zealand’s navy.
Boeing Defence Australia’s MQ-28A Ghost Bat, which was designed and built in Australia and has good export prospects, is also a nice example of where the Japan–Australia defence industrial partnerships could be headed. The Ghost Bat shows it’s possible to work with US-linked companies without brokering cooperation through Washington. As highlighted by Koizumi and Marles, a framework is in place that enables Japan and Australia to exchange information about the Ghost Bat, which could lead to industrial and operational cooperation in crewed-uncrewed systems.
Beyond the bilateral context, Tokyo’s defence export reform will improve confidence in the Indo-Pacific that Japan is now a genuine defence power, contributing to regional security. Koizumi’s establishment of a Pacific Defence Planning Office shows Tokyo appreciates the risks China poses in the Pacific island countries, some of which straddle potentially vital north-south sea lanes connecting Japan and Australia.
Having greater leeway to provide defence equipment to countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific complements the expansion of Japan’s military attache network and official security assistance. It also dovetails with the widening security remit of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Japan’s export credit agency, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
The new export rules announced today are just one piece of Takaichi’s defence and security reforms, which include significant increases to military spending. More announcements are expected this year, with the overhaul of Japan’s three main strategic documents – the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy and Defence Build Up Program. Takaichi has gained public trust by openly communicating the need for such reforms.
Beijing has noticed and is pulling coercive levers to discredit Takaichi and stifle her reform program. Some of this is clumsy, such as a Chinese diplomat’s death threats against Takaichi that possibly helped her win a historic mandate in February’s general election. But Beijing is also using more pernicious tools across the region, attempting to play on history and misrepresent Japan as backsliding into imperialism, as ASPI’s research collaboration with Japan Nexus Intelligence has uncovered.
Given the need for collective pushback against Beijing’s subversion, it’s heartening that Australia welcomed Japan’s defence export reforms as helping to ‘safeguard regional and global peace and stability’ in the joint statement released by Marles and Koizumi on 18 April.
The stage is set for Takaichi’s upcoming visit to Australia, marking the 50th Anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, also called the Nara Treaty. That visit, which is likely to focus on economic security, will be an opportunity to elevate what Australia and Japan call their special strategic partnership to something closer to a formal alliance.
The visit – which reportedly could take place in late April or early May – is also an opportunity to set the right impression and narrative. The Japanese media and public put great stock in their prime ministers having rapport with US presidents, as shown by the celebrated ‘Ron-Yasu’ relationship between Ronald Reagan and Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 1980s; the friendship between Junichiro Koizumi and George W Bush in the 2000s, which was helped by their shared fascination with Elvis; and most recently the warm words exchanged between Takaichi and Donald Trump.
Canberra has for some time recognised the importance of Japan to regional security and its national interest: the National Defence Strategy issued on 16 April referred to Japan as ‘an indispensable partner’. But it is less clear how Tokyo views Australia. A visit in which Takaichi and Anthony Albanese display the same kind of relaxed cordiality could grasp the public imagination in both countries and give the bilateral relationship the personal touch that is a hallmark of close friendship.