Taiwan is accelerating development of its asymmetric defenses — often known as the “porcupine strategy” — to deny the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) forces a quick victory in any potential cross-strait conflict.
The self-governed island’s defense doctrine emphasizes mobile, lower-cost systems, such as drones, coastal anti-ship missiles and portable air-defense systems, alongside dispersed operations and domestic production.
Those priorities underpin the concept of multidomain deterrence, which emphasizes layered defenses across land, sea, air and cyber domains, according to Aadil Brar, a Taiwan Foreign Affairs Ministry fellow and visiting scholar at National Chengchi University in Taipei.
With Taiwan unable to match the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in terms of airpower, naval capacity, missile forces or industrial depth, the objective is “to survive the initial strikes, preserve enough combat power, and impose sufficient military and political costs to make invasion unattractive,” Brar told FORUM.
In March 2026, Taiwan lawmakers agreed to a series of defense asset purchases, including United States-made platforms such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, M109A7 self-propelled howitzers and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.
The agreement reflects widespread recognition in Taipei that the PLA threat requires sustained investment, particularly in the wake of unprecedented gray-zone escalations by Beijing, which claims Taiwan as its territory and threatens to annex the island by force. In late 2025, the PLA’s Justice Mission exercise simulated a maritime blockade, deploying more than 130 aircraft and 14 vessels to choke off Taiwan’s key ports. A month later, a PLA drone breached Taiwan’s airspace.
Taipei also is boosting domestic production of munitions and other defense systems to ensure operations are sustained even if supply chains are disrupted during a crisis.
The Russia-Ukraine War has reinforced the concept that a smaller defender can frustrate a larger attacker “through mobility, dispersion, resilient logistics and large numbers of relatively cheap but effective systems,” Brar said.
Taiwan defense planners have integrated Ukraine’s approach to the use of uncrewed systems and decentralized operations. According to the 2025 National Defense Report, the military plans to acquire more than 5,000 drones by 2028, with more than 1,600 already delivered. Uncrewed systems will be integrated into a defensive “kill web” that links sensors and weapons to strike adversary forces.
“Mobile, lower-cost systems offer three clear advantages: They are harder to target, easier to disperse and much more favorable in terms of cost exchange,” Brar said, noting that a truck-mounted missile launcher or drone swarm can threaten assets that cost hundreds of times more to replace.
Geography also shapes Taiwan’s strategy. Any PLA invasion would require a complex amphibious assault across the 160-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait. “Amphibious denial is central because an invasion force is most vulnerable during the crossing and landing phase,” Brar said.
To exploit this, mines, coastal missiles and drones would target adversary vessels during the crossing. Taiwan’s arsenal includes weapons to destroy armor during beachhead assaults, and training increasingly prioritizes anti-landing operations.
“If Taiwan can credibly threaten the PLA’s ability to land, reinforce and sustain forces onshore, it strengthens deterrence significantly,” Brar said.